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ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY INTELLIGENCE-
GATHERING: AN APPRAISAL OF THE
INVESTIGATIVE POWERS OF THE
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
RICHARD S. MILLER*
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness . . . They conferred, as against
the Government, the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive
of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect that
right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the pri-
vacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be
deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting, in Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
A Commission which is without coercive powers, which cannot arrest
or amerce or imprison though a crime has been uncovered, or even
punish for contempt, but can only inquire and report, the propriety
of every question in the course of the inquiry being subject to the
supervision of the ordinary courts of justice, is likened with denun-
ciatory fervor to the Star Chamber of the Stuarts. Historians may
find hyperbole in the sanguinary simile.
Mr. Justice Cardozo, joined by Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr.
Justice Stone, dissenting, in Jones v. Securities and Exch.
Comm'n, 298 U.S. 1, 33 (1936).
INTRODUCTION
As the decision-making functions of governmental institutions in
contemporary society grow in complexity and breadth, the need for
information as a basis for performing these functions grows at a com-
mensurate, if not a greater, rate. This need, in turn, has been reflected
in a widespread increase in demands by decison-makers for expansion
of the quantities and kinds of instruments and strategies of intelligence-
gathering available to them. In general, the response has been the
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School, Detroit, Michigan; member
of the Massachusetts and Michigan Bars.
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creation of new strategies and instruments of investigation which can
be placed within a continuum between pure persuasion, at one extreme,
and high coercion, at the other. These devices include highly sophisti-
cated mechanical systems, such as polygraphs, drunkometers, data
processing equipment, electronic eavesdropping devices, radar, U-2 re-
connaissance aircraft and spy-in-the-sky satellites, as well as such
legal techniques as pre-trial discovery and the compelling of testimony
in exchange for immunity from prosecution.
In behalf of the individuals, groups or institutions from whom
the needed information is sought and against whom the various strate-
gies and instruments are used, claims are frequently made to impose
limitations upon the intelligence-gathering process. These claims are
usually founded upon legal doctrine—constitutional or statutory pro-
tections and privileges in the case of domestic claims, and theories of
the rights of sovereign states in the case of international claims.' The
doctrines, in turn, are ordinarily based on policies which favor per-
sonal, group or institutional security and freedom from invasions of
privacy.
In responding to such claims, the decision-makers with primary
authority to limit intelligence-gathering have frequently focused their
attention on underlying policies, and not on the legal doctrine. The
decisive question is whether the functions which are performed and
the interests served by the governmental institution seeking the infor-
mation are more or less important than the interests threatened by the
use of the strategy or instrument which is attacked.'
In the United States the immediate interests served by the gov-
ernmental body have frequently given way to the interest of the in-
dividual or the group in their own security or "right to be let alone."'
The absence of effective alternative methods of intelligence-gathering
1 The suggested analogy between domestic claims and international claims may be
interesting, but should not be carried too far. There are obviously important legal and
policy differences between claims by the Soviet or Cuban governments for cessation of
overflights by American U-2 aircraft and claims by an individual in an American court to
have his conviction set aside because of a coerced confession or an unreasonable search.
2 This is especially common in the international arena, where vital decisions are
ordinarily made by the officials of nation-states rather than by judicial decision-makers
appealing to a well-developed body of legal doctrine. In the international arena, the
interests served by the governmental institution may well be all the values of the society
it represents, while the interests threatened by a continued use of the challenged strategy
or instrument may include those very same values, since the nation under observation
may have the power and the will to resort to force to prevent further intelligence-gather-
ing. This would tend to account for the fact that the United States responded differently
to Soviet demands to stop overflights than to similar claims by the Cubans. In the former
case policy dictated resort to an alternative—satellites—however ineffective, in order to
avoid serious consequences realistically perceived. In Cuba's case, the balancing process
has so far failed to predominate in favor of a similar decision.
3 See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (19M) ; McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S.
332 (1943) ; Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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has not been a major factor in such decisions largely because the poll-
des of the government as a whole, expressed generally in the Consti-
tution, have coincided with the claimant's interest in security against
governmental intrusion even if the interests immediately served by
the government agency seeking the information did not.
In general this balancing has worked against those performing
the intelligence function where the strategy is one involving substan-
tial coercion,' where the instrument used operates surreptitiously, 5
where the strategy is not regulated by institutional safeguards,' where
the purpose of the investigation is to provide information which might
lead to punishment of the party against whom the strategy is directed
for the commission of a crime 7 and, particularly, where more than one
of these elements converge. In such cases the dangers to private se-
curity have usually been quite clear, and individual-protective policies
embodied in constitutional and legislative provisions have tended to
prevail over the policies which would be served by the acquisition of
the information.
There is one area, however, where the balance in the last thirty
years has worked in favor of the governmental body seeking informa-
tion and against the private individual or group. In the main, the de-
mands of administrative agencies for more information to support their
functions have been gratified, in the courts and in the legislature, by
expansion of the inquisitorial powers of such agencies and by contrac-
tion of the right to withhold the needed information.' Most of the in-
vestigations conducted by these agencies do not strike the nerve-chords
mentioned above. The only coercion involved is by judicial process; the
instrument of investigation is usually the taking of testimony and ex-
amination of books and records rather than surreptitious devices; the
process is surrounded by judicial safeguards by which the investigated
party is given access to the courts to complain of abuses; and the
authorized use of the information sought is for purposes other than
invoking the criminal laws. In the absence of such factors, the legisla-
tive policies carried out by the information-seeking agency have
been deemed, on balance, to be more worthy of advancement than the
recusant witness's abstract right to be let alone.'
In such cases the Supreme Court has tended to generalize the
' Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961) ; McNabb v. United States, supra
note 3.
5 Sec § 605 of the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1103; Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) ; Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957).
° 1 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) ; Mapp v, Ohio, supra note 3.
T Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964) ; Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S.
1 (1964) ; Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951).
8 Sec 1 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 3.14 (1958, Supp. 1963).
9 Ibid.
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problem, treating most administrative agency investigations alike with-
out regard for or sensitivity to differences among them.' Yet there may
be factors, associated with the investigatory activities of some agencies,
which would shift the balance in favor of a contraction or, in some
situations, even an expansion,' of their inquisitorial powers. Where
the presence of such factors is suspected in the case of a particular
agency, re-examination of the interests affected by its investigations
would seem to serve a useful purpose.
It is my intention to focus upon the Internal Revenue Service, the
most ubiquitous of all administrative agencies. My approach will be to
examine and clarify the policies at stake in light of the societal condi-
tions which affect those policies; to establish some policy goals which
ought to be served by tax investigations and by the limitations imposed
upon such investigations; to describe the trends in decision-making
which have affected the investigatory powers of the Service; to attempt
to predict the implications of past decisional trends in light of conditions
which might bear upon future decisions; and, lastly, to suggest alterna-
tives to current practices which will tend to accommodate the important
policies which compete for dominance."
II. CLARIFICATION OF POLICIES
The Supreme Court, in United States v. Powell, 13
 has recently
held that a summons issued by the Internal Revenue Service for the
production of tax records will be judicially enforced without a showing
of probable cause to suspect fraud, even though the records under in-
vestigation have been subjected to an earlier examination and the
statute of limitations on ordinary tax liability has barred additional as-
sessments except for fraud. The conflict of values resolved by the de-
cision was not discussed, the Court resting its decision upon earlier
precedents established in cases dealing with other federal agencies and
upon statutory interpretation. A comparison of two earlier courts of
10 See, e.g., United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964) where the Court stated:
"While the power of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue derives from a different body
of statutes, we do not think the analogies to other agency situations are without force
when the scope of the Commissioner's power is called in question." Id. at 57. But compare
Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960), where the Court drew a distinction between
agencies engaged in adjudicatory functions and those which did not have the power to
adjudicate rights,
11 In Hannah v. Larche, supra note 10, the Court held that the Civil Rights Com-
mission was not obliged to accord witnesses before it the rights of confrontation, apprisal
or cross-examination since, unlike other agencies, it was not performing an adjudicative
function. See further discussion in the text at Pt. III(A) (3), infra, following note 84.
12 McDougal & Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of
Public Order, 53 Am. J. Int'l L. 1 (1959), reprinted in McDougal & Associates, Studies in
World Public Order 3 (1960). My approach attempts to follow, somewhat impres-
sionistically, the methodology suggested in these sources.
13 Supra note 10. Accord, Ryan v. United States, 379 U.S. 61 (1964) (companion
case).
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appeals opinions in which the policy preferences were articulated will
serve to highlight the premises underlying that conflict.
In O'Connor v. O'Connell" the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit reversed a district court order compelling a taxpayer to obey
a summons issued to him by the IRS. The summons had directed the
taxpayer to appear and testify with respect to possible tax deficiencies
for years which, except for fraud, were closed to assessment by the
statute of limitations. In support of the order, a special agent had testi-
fied that, as a result of his calculations, he honestly believed the tax-
payer had filed false returns for the years under examination. In
reversing, the court held that a purely subjective suspicion of fraud
on the part of the revenue agent was an insufficient basis for granting
court enforcement of the summons. Speaking for the court, Judge
Woodbury stated:
[B] efore the tax authorities are entitled to a district court
order enforcing a summons directing a taxpayer to testify as
to a closed year they must establish to the district court's
satisfaction that a reasonable basis exists for a suspicion of
fraud, or put another way, that there is probable cause to
believe that the taxpayer was guilty of fraud in a statute
barred year. 15
Only a short time later the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit handed down a ruling which contrasted sharply with that in
O'Connor. In Foster v. United States," the court refused to vacate
a district court order directing the local agency of a foreign bank to
comply with a summons issued by the IRS ordering the bank to pro-
duce records relating to the accounts of Foster, whose tax liability was
under investigation. In his opinion, Judge Hincks brushed aside the
taxpayer's contention that a summons in aid of an investigation of tax
years barred from assessment by the statute of limitations except for
fraud could be enforced only upon a showing of probable cause for be-
lieving that those years were still open to assessment. He stated:
"[The Commissioner, as a condition to the issuance of a summons
under §§ 7602 and 7604, should not be required to prove grounds for
belief that the liability was not time barred 'prior to examination of the
only records which provide the ultimate proof.' 117
While the "third party" examination involved in the Foster case
perhaps presented a stronger case for summons enforcement than the
fact situation in O'Connor," attempts to reconcile the conflicting ap-
14 253 F.2d 365 (1st Cir. 1958).
15 Id. at 370.
16 265 F.2d 183 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 912 (1959).
17 Id. at 187.
]8 In O'Connor the summons was issued on February 7, 1957, requesting taxpayer to
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proaches taken by the two courts on a purely factual basis prove frus-
trating. In the first place, Judge Woodbury expressly rejected the rea-
soning in the line of tax summons cases relied upon by Judge Hincks
to support his decision in Foster." Secondly, Judge Hincks, while no-
ting that O'Connor involved a summons directed personally to the tax-
payer rather than a third-party summons, refused to rest his decision
on this distinction, preferring a "broader ground."'
Rather, the decisions in these cases represented a serious differ-
ence of opinion concerning the rights of witnesses in administrative
investigations in general, and in tax investigations in particular. "Con-
stitutional immunity from unreasonable searches," said Judge Hincks,
"does not relieve a citizen of the testimonial duty to disclose informa-
tion needed for the just and proper discharge of governmental func-
tions."21 Judge Woodbury, however, proclaimed that his decision was
in accord with the limitations upon the inquisitorial powers of
government which have become traditional in this country.
We agree with Judge Moscowitz' statement in In Re Brook-
lyn Pawnbrokers, Inc. . . . that "to permit the government to
examine as to statute barred years upon a mere conclusory
allegation of fraud is to deprive the taxpayer of that freedom
from unreasonable harassment which he has a right to expect
under a democratic form of government.""
Thus the issue may be framed as a conflict between governmental
power and private rights; this is a conflict very similar to that which,
testify as to his and his wife's tax liability for the years 1943 to 1954. At the hearing, the
taxpayer refused to answer questions only as to the years 1943 to 1947, for which the
taxpayers had filed returns (although the 1943 return had been destroyed by the revenue
officials). The taxpayer asserted that counsel who had prepared the returns in question
had died and that the accountant who assisted in their preparation was over 80 years old
and suffered from a defective memory. The asserted basis for the investigation was that
the agent's calculations, based on the early returns, had indicated a substantial untaxed
increase in taxpayer's net worth for the years in question. In Foster, the summons was
issued on August 29, 1957, requesting the third party, a bank, to appear and produce
books, papers and records with respect to the period 1949 to 1956. The taxpayer, who had
maintained no account in the bank since August, 1949, objected to the examination of the
bank's records for the period prior to that time. The examining agent urged in his affidavit
that the examination of the requested books and records "afford the only opportunity"
for the government to determine whether income excluded by the taxpayer actually con-
stituted taxable income. There was no specific allegation that the passage of time had put
the taxpayer in a more difficult position because of faded memories or absence of wit-
nesses, as there was in O'Connor.
39 Sec Foster v. United States, supra note 16, at 186; O'Connor v. O'Connell, supra
note 14, at 369.
20 Foster v. United States, supra note 16, at 188 n.3. The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit had earlier arrived at the same result in an investigation of the taxpayer
himself in Application of United States (Carroll), 246 F.2d 762 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 857 (1957).
21 Foster v. United Stales, supra note 16, at 188.
22 O'Connor v. O'Connell, supra note 14, at 370.
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in large measure, helped create the furor which led to this nation's
drive for independence and which is still the cause for ringing dissents
and exalted prose.'
Isolating the general nature of the conflict as one involving the
fundamental ideals of our society, however, is only a first step, since
the dangers to individual rights in IRS investigations may not be as ap-
parent as those which were present when James Otis inveighed against
the "odious writs of assistance." The legitimate informational needs of
the agency are much greater than the founding fathers could have
contemplated, and the methods of filling these needs are more subtle
and complex. The temptation to give in to the government's demand
is almost irresistible, especially when one considers the ultimate public
benefit.
The Supreme Court has generally yielded to that temptation in
passing upon the investigatory powers of administrative agencies."
Thus, the O'Connor case, even before it was overruled in Powell,
seemed to be an anachronism. The Supreme Court has not, however,
undertaken to root out the special problems involved in federal tax
investigations, but has accepted analogies to other agencies rather un-
critically.25
Considering the fact that our society's traditional concern with
the preservation of the integrity and dignity of the individual is one
of the main features which distinguishes it from the tyrannous regimes
we profess to abhor, it would not seem wise merely to categorize the
rationale of O'Connor as aberrant or anachronistic and reject it out of
hand. Instead, it becomes relevant to ask whether there are any factors
involved in tax investigations which might cause the scales to register
a different result.
On the side of the public interest it must be conceded that an
adequate source of revenue is the sine qua non of effective governmen-
tal operation in a modern society; of this there can be no serious dis-
pute. Moreover, it must be added that the self-assessment system of
taxation would probably founder if adequate means of investigation
were not provided for the IRS. Accordingly, the public interest in ef-
fective instruments of tax collection, including adequate power of in-
vestigation, weighs as heavily on the scale as does the public interest
in any regulatory program or, for that matter, in any authorized gov-
ernmental activity supported by tax dollars.
On the other side of the scale, however, the interest in private
23 See, e.g., Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 36 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting) ; Hubner v. Tucker, 245 F.2d 35, 41 (9th Cir. 1957) ; Griswold, The Fifth
Amendment Today (1955). For a discussion of the historical background see Boyd v.
United States, supra nate 3, at 624-30, 635.
24 Davis, supra note 8, at 3.14.
25 Sec cases cited in note 10 supra.
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security may weigh more heavily in revenue investigations than in
those conducted by other agencies. In the first place, the investigatory
power placed in the hands of the Internal Revenue officials is bound
by no practical limitations with respect to the possible objects of its
attention. No documentation is needed to show that practically every
person or firm, trust, or charity resident in the United States and its
territories is subject to investigation regarding its own tax liability or
the tax liability of others with whom it deals. The requirements of rele-
vance and materiality, on the other hand, are more likely to operate as
effective limitations on the range of objects of investigations conducted
by other agencies charged with more specialized functions; in such
cases the summoned party's relationship, or lack of relationship, to an
authorized purpose of investigation may be obvious.
This fact, that everyone is an appropriate target of tax investiga-
tions, becomes significant as a result of other considerations unique
to the IRS. First, the type of data collected by the Service can be of
immense value to hundreds of other agencies and institutions, be they
state or federal, public or private. It is of special importance to the
officials and organs charged with the function of invoking criminal pre-
scriptions, such as prosecutors and crime commissions.' In the hands
of persons interested in destroying political enemies or persecuting
members of society deemed by them to be undesirable, its utility
is obvious." Even the IRS itself has, on occasion, attempted to use
26
 The most obvious examples are the situations where the information can be used
to prosecute a known gangster for tax evasion, see Capone v. United States 56 F.2d 927
(7th Cir.), cert, denied, 286 U.S. 553 (1932) and Capone v. United States, 51 F.2d 609
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 669 (1931) ; or where the primary purpose of a particular
federal tax is not to raise revenue but to provide information to officials who will
prosecute criminals under state criminal laws. See United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22
(1953), in which the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the federal tax on persons
engaged in the business of accepting wagers, Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 4401-05, 4411.
See also Anderson, What Price Conviction, A.B.A. Section of Criminal Law Proceedings
42 (1958), in Paulsen & Kadish, Criminal Law and Its Processes 978 (1962):
Finally, I would like to say just briefly that we are attacking the question of
organized crime in a new way. . . What we need to fight them, we feel in the
Department of Justice, is a long-range, permanent plan built into the Department
of Justice. We also attach to that the idea of looking at individuals, picking the
top hundred, and attacking them by looking at everything they do, rather than
looking to see if they violate the narcotics law, or looking to see if they violate
the Hobbs Racketeering Act. We are looking at everything they do, and we are
coming up with evidence of antitrust violations where they have crept into
business.
We are finding Taft-Hartley violations, Securities Exchange violations,
Food and Drug violations, and we are going to use this idea of looking at the
individual and trying to map out everything that he is doing, concentrating on
him as a means of trying to break up organized crime.
Cf. Schwartz, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction and Prosecutors' Discretion, 13 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 64 (1948) ; Arnold, Law Enforcement—An Attempt at Social Dis-
section, 42 Yale L.J. 1 (1932).
27 See Edmund Wilson's fiery polemic in The Cold War and The Income Tax: A
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its investigatory powers for unauthorized purposes,' and reciprocal
exchanges of information with other agencies of government have be-
come commonplace."
Secondly, few other federal administrative agencies have as many
permanent personnel with delegated investigatory powers located in
every major section of the country as the IRS has today. 8°
Protest 26 (1963). Cf. People v. Darcy, 59 Cal. App. 2d 342, 139 P.2d 118 (1943) ;
Comment, The Right to Nondiscriminatory Enforcement of State Penal Laws, 61 Colum.
L. Rev. 1103 (1961) and Note, Discriminatory Law Enforcement and Equal Protection
From the Laws, 59 Yale L.J. 354 (1959).
Claims that candidates for political office have evaded income taxes, widely publicized
just prior to an election, are not unknown.
28 See Lash v. Nighosian, 273 F.2d 185, 187-88 (1st Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S.
904 (1960) (here, one of the purposes in issuing the summons to the taxpayer was to inves-
tigate conduct of revenue agents) and Boren v. Tucker, 239 F.2d 767, 772-73 (9th Cir.
1957) (here, the government's purpose included the securing of evidence for a criminal
prosecution). The authorized purposes of tax investigation do not include either of the
secondary objectives pursued in these cases. Int. Rev, Code of 1954, § 7602. Compare
United States v, Powell, supra note 10, at 58, and United States v. O'Connor, 118 F. Supp.
248 (D. Mass. 1953). In O'Connor the court refused to enforce a subpoena where the
special agent admitted that one of the purposes was "to further a criminal prosecution
for which he has no official responsibility," that there was no matter of taxpayer's liability
pending before him, and that he had already completed the report on taxpayer which had
been requested by his superior officer. Id. at 250.
It is also interesting to note that the IRS, in a booklet entitled Careers, has described
the special agent as one who "will make investigations of suspected and alleged tax fraud
and other related criminal violations." (Emphasis added.) I.R.S. Doc. No. 5282 (rev.
10-63) 14 (1963).
29 As of June 22, 1964, there were 31 Tax Administration Agreements providing for
mutual exchanges of information for tax enforcement purposes between the IRS and state
governments. 1964 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 25, at 73.
See generally, as to inspection of tax returns, Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6103; Treas.
Reg. § 301,6103(a)-1—(f)-1 (1961); CCH 1964 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. 1111 5207-5209.60.
Of special interest are executive orders which give the House Committee on Un-
American Activities the right to inspect tax returns. See, e.g., Exec. Order No, 11109, 28
Fed. Reg. 5351 (1963). Other similar orders are listed in CCH 1964 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep.
1 5204.11.
Limitations upon the authority of revenue personnel to divulge information disclosed
in tax returns or to permit examination of returns, where such authority is not provided
by law, are set forth in Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7213. Criminal sanctions are provided for
violations of this section. However, the Supreme Court has stated, in Blair v. Oesterlein
Mach. Co., 275 U.S. 225, 227 (1927), that these limitations "cannot be deemed to forbid
disclosures made in obedience to process lawfully issued in a judicial or quasi-judicial
proceeding, . „"
18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1958) makes it a crime for an officer or employee of the United
States to disclose, divulge or publish the sort of information that might come to the
attention of a revenue agent conducting a tax investigation to the extent that such dis-
closure is "not authorized by law." The annotations to this code section are revealing in
that they do not include any cases involving violations by officers or employees of the IRS.
39 Cf. United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical
Abstract of the United States 406, Table 542 (1964) ; Statement of Organization and
Functions, 1961-2 Cum. Bull. 483.
As to the delegation of investigatory power see text at Pt. V(B) (1), infra, and
Beatty v. United States, 227 F.2d 350 (8th Cir. 1955).
See also Application of House, 144 F. Supp. 95, 103 (N.D. Cal. 1956) ("The field
of taxation represents probably the greatest single area of contact between individuals
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Thirdly, the use by the IRS of modern technological devices such
as automatic data processing has made the collection and collation of
the information extraordinarily efficient." Such data, therefore, be-
comes correspondingly more efficient for whatever authorized or un-
authorized purpose it may be used.
Lastly, it is probably fair to assume that agents of the IRS, in the
popular perspective, are thought to be relatively innocuous: most citi-
zens, at least the uninitiated, are likely to think of them somewhat in-
differently, perhaps as petty bureaucrats.' Mention of the IRS does
not conjure up the almost glamorous, secretive importance of the FBI,
nor the awesome dignity of the grand jury with its closed proceedings.
It is for this reason that investigations performed by the Service gen-
erally go unpublicized and unnoticed. The abuses which occur are or-
dinarily treated as the private concern of the aggrieved individuals,
and hardly as a general problem for the entire society.
But surely, if there exists any danger that government will some-
day seek the prerogatives of a "Big Brother" in order to maintain sur-
veillance over the everyday business, financial, and economic activities
of its citizens—perhaps for the purpose of harassing the nonconform-
ists and the dissenters—the threat may come from a large, powerful
and efficient agency which has access to the financial papers and
records of all people, and is accepted by most as, at worst, a slight nui-
sance or necessary evil. Such an agency could expand its examinations
and its improper functions gradually, without giving any sudden cause
for alarm. It would seem that there is no other existing agency which
fits the bill as well as the IRS.
Of course, it would be a gross exaggeration to characterize the
Service, as it functions today, as the all-seeing governmental clearing
house described above. Aside from self-restraint, however, only judi-
cial control or legislative action can prevent the Service from develop-
ing into such an agency. As to the effectiveness of self-restraint, the
reliable chestnut about the corrupting influence of power offers little
hope. To those doubters who cannot imagine such a development it may
and the force of the state.") and Rogge, Inquisition by Officials: A Study of Due Process
Requirements in Administrative Investigations—I, 47 Minn. L. Rev. 939, 964-70 (1963)
("The agency that has the oldest investigative subpoena powers, the most varied as well
as the most severe enforcement procedures and probably has issued the greatest number
of such subpoenas is the Internal Revenue Service." Id. at 964.)
31 Sec Caplin, Taxpayer-Identifying Number System: The Key to Modern Tax
Administration, 49 A.B.A.J. 1161 (1963) ; Engquist, Improved Statistics Resulting from
the ADP System, 41 Taxes 39 (1963) ; Leibowitz, Use of Taxpayer Identifying Numbers
by Individuals, Business and the Government, 41 Taxes 31 (1963) ; Smith, Automatic
Data Processing in the Internal Revenue Service, 41 Taxes 26 (1963) ; Surrey, Automatic
Data Processing and Tax Administration: The Potentialities of ADP, 17 Tax L. Rev.
165 (1961).
Cf., as to identifying numbers, Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 6109, 6676.
32 But see Wilson, supra note 27, at 101.
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be replied that it requires more optimism than this writer can muster to
suggest that conditions—the same conditions which have nurtured the
growth of the most pernicious forms of political extremism—are not
present which could turn risk into reality."
In federal tax investigations, therefore, it is not only the private
interest of a particular individual or group to be free from harassment
which must be placed on the scale, as may be the case with other, more
specialized, agencies." Rather, it is the collective private interest of all
citizens in keeping potentially enormous investigative power within
bounds which is to be considered."
33 Others have also expressed concern about the potential expansion of power. See,
e.g., Packard, The Naked Society 42 (1964):
If information is power, Americans should be uneasy about the amount of
information the federal government is starting to file in its memory banks. There
are, for example, the gigantic memory machines which the Internal Revenue
Service is starting to use to check data from our tax returns against data accumu-
lated about us from other sources, such as employers and banks. The computers
also watch for unlikely patterns. Obviously these memory banks are useful tools
for fair and efficient tax collecting. But what are the implications for two decades
from now, in 1984? If future bureaucrats choose, they can build up so-called
"cum," or cumulative, files on each taxpayer over decades, and thus will have,
instantly recallable, a vast amount of personal information about the living
habits of every adult in the nation.
See also Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 673,
746 (1963): "Bureaucracy, a predominant underlying force in the executive branch, is
characterized by its need steadily to increase its own powers; it seems intrinsically in-
capable of imposing limits, constitutional or otherwise, on itself."
The Supreme Court, too, has recognized and, on occasion, dealt with the danger of
expanding governmental investigating power. In Boyd v. United States, supra note 3, at
635, the decision which is the foundation of constitutional limitations on investigative
power, the Court said:
Though the proceeding in question is divested of many of the aggravating inci-
dents of actual search and seizure, yet, as before said, it contains their substance
and essence, and effects their substantial purpose. It may be that it is the ob-
noxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form; but illegitimate and uncon-
stitutional practices get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent ap-
proaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only be
obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the security
of person and property should be liberally construed. A close and literal construc-
tion deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of
the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of
courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any
stealthy encroachments thereon. Their motto should be obsta principiis. We
have no doubt that the legislative body is actuated by the same motives; but
the vast accumulation of public business brought before it sometimes prevents it,
on a first presentation, from noticing objections which become developed by time
and the practical application of the objectionable law,
34 See, e.g., Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 203 n.30, 213 (1946).
35 Sec Reich, supra note 33, at 739-40; Application of House, supra note 30, at 103
("A slight invasion of the right against self-incrimination in this field [tax investigations]
has as great and baleful consequences upon the relations between the individual and the
state as does an invasion of that right in the more dramatic areas of public life.")
However, not every aspect of revenue investigations involves this larger interest. Thus
when taxpayer raised the physician-patient privilege in In re Albert Lindley Lee Memorial
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To be fair, however, it must be conceded that the expansion of
the IRS into a clearing house for information might be useful and
efficient from the point of view of governmental administration." This,
however, merely adds another grain to the already heavily weighted
public interest side of the scale.
The problem, therefore, resolves itself into a conflict between com-
peting interests which is similar in characteristics and importance to
other controversies now being resolved in our society, e.g., private
property versus civil rights, and enforcement of the criminal law
versus civil liberties. But it has already been demonstrated that
it is not necessary to sacrifice, or even to threaten, all the interests on
one side of a controversy in order to resolve it. The institution of pri-
vate property still stands, notwithstanding the passage of the civil
rights acts, and the enforcement of the criminal laws continues despite
decisions such as Mapp v. Ohio. Similarly, with regard to tax investi-
gations, the goal must be to achieve an accommodation which will maxi-
mize all of the interdependent values without sacrificing any one of
them. It thus becomes necessary to conduct a fairly detailed examina-
tion of current practices as a first step in framing such an accommoda-
tion.
III. DECISIONAL TRENDS
Decisions which affect the intelligence-gathering functions of ad-
ministrative agencies are not made only by courts. The Congress, in
deciding to grant investigative power; the agencies, in framing policies
and regulations designed to fill the gaps in broadly phrased legislation;
and even minor officials, in deciding to invoke investigative powers in
particular situations, are also engaging in decisional processes. It is
only through examination of the totality of the decisions which are
the outcome of these processes that we can determine whether the
sought-after accommodation between competing policies is actually be-
ing achieved.
The assumption has already been made, however, that self-re-
straint on the part of the officials of the agency in question cannot be
depended upon to provide permanently effective limitations on inves-
tigative power. Thus, the fact that the IRS is currently imposing
reasonable restrictions upon its own decisions to invoke its investigative
powers and is not even using all the coercive strategies and inquisitorial
Hosp., 209 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1953), the court was probably correct in replying: "The
public interest in the collection of taxes owing by a taxpayer outweighs the private
interest of the patient to avoid embarassment resulting from being required to give the
revenue agent information as to fees paid the attending physician." Id. at 124.
36
 Professor Meltzer has referred to the use by agency A of information gathered
by agency B as "sensible governmental cooperation." Meltzer, Required Records, The
McCarran Act, and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 18 U. Chi. L. Rev. 687, 718
(1951).
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instruments available to it,'T while laudable, is irrelevant to the longer-
range purposes of this article.
The decisions to be examined, therefore, are those which control
the outer limits of the exercise of inquisitorial power by agency offi-
cials. These decisions and the trends they indicate must first be ex-
amined for the limitations they actually impose rather than for the
limitations they might be held to impose, given a liberal interpretation
by a decision-maker disposed to restraining investigative power.
Since all of the decisions in this area are controlled, ultimately, by
constitutional policy, and since the Supreme Court is the final arbiter
of that policy, the leading decisions of that Court will be examined
first.
A. The Supreme Court
There seems to be general agreement that the approach of the
Supreme Court toward administrative investigations has changed
rather radically from the one of strict control and narrow limitation
of power, enunciated as late as 1936, 38 to the one of expansive and
practically uncontrolled permissiveness thereafter.'" A few leading
decisions can be marshalled to support this observation. Although
some of them have received extensive comment elsewhere," it will be
useful to describe them briefly here.
37 Such as the "required records" doctrine, Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1
(1948). Cf. Mortenson, Federal Tax Fraud Law 58 (1958),
38 E.g., Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1 (1936).
ao See Cooper, Federal Agency Investigations: Requirements for the Production of
Documents, 60 Mich. L. Rev. 187, 197 (1961) ; Davis, The Administrative Power of
Investigation, 56 Yale L.J. 1111 (1947) ; Note, 49 Mich. L. Rev. 436 (1951).
The pendulum may be swinging back toward increased judicial control. See, e.g.,
United States v. Powell, supra note 10 and Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440 (1964).
40 See Davis, supra note 8, at 159; Benton, Administrative Subpoena Enforcement,
41 Texas L. Rev. 874 (1963) ; Cooper, supra note 39; Meltzer, supra note 36; Murchison,
Rights of Persons Compelled to Appear in Federal Agency Investigational Hearings, 62
Mich. L. Rev. 485 (1964) ; Newman, Due Process, Investigations and Civil Rights, g
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 735 (1961) ; Newman, Federal Agency Investigations: Procedural Rights
of the Subpoenaed Witness, 60 Mich. L. Rev. 169 (1961); Redlich, Searches, Seizures, and
Self-Incrimination in Tax Cases, 10 Tax L. Rev. 191 (1954); Sherwood, The Enforce-
ment of Administrative Subpoenas, 44 Colum. L. Rev. 531 (1944) ; Note, Discovery in
Federal Administrative Proceedings, 16 Stan. L. Rev. 1035 (1964) ; Note, Enforcement of
the Administrative Subpoena: An Abdication of Judicial Inquiry, 27 Albany L. Rev. 239
(1962) ; Note, Resisting Enforcement of Administrative Subpoenas Duces Tecum: Another
Look at CAB v. Hermann, 69 Yale L.J. 131 (1959); Note, Rights of the Taxpayer to
Withhold Records During a Tax Investigation, 42 B.U.L. Rev. 227 (1962).
For earlier discussions of constitutional limitations on congressional or administrative
agency investigative power see Handler, The Constitutionality of Investigations by the
FTC, 28 Colum. L. Rev. 905 (1928) ; Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Con-
gressional Power of Investigation, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 153 (1926) ; Lilienthal, The Power
of Governmental Agencies to Compel Testimony, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 694 (1926) ;
MacChesney & Murphy, Investigatory and Enforcement Powers of the Federal Trade
Commission, 8 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 581 (1940).
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1. The Fourth Amendment"
In United States v. Powell," the Court, while holding that prob-
able cause to suspect a violation of the revenue laws need not be shown
as a prerequisite to judicial enforcement of an IRS summons for books
and records, did not dwell on the prohibitions contained in the Fourth
Amendment: the opinions, majority and dissenting, are in fact devoid
of any direct references to constitutional requirements. Nonetheless,
the Court reinforced its view that the applicable statutes did not re-
quire a showing of probable cause by referring to earlier decisions, in-
volving other agencies, in which similar claims to limit agency power
were based on the Fourth Amendment. These decisions, Oklahoma
Press Pub. Co. v. Walling" and United States v. Morton Salt Co.,'"
plus one prior case, Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins,' constitute a
trilogy which marked the reversal of the earlier, restrictive trend by
diluting, if not abolishing, the requirement of probable cause as a
condition to the enforcement of an administrative subpoena.
In Endicott Johnson Corp., the Secretary of Labor issued a sub-
poena calling for payroll records from certain of petitioner's plants in
order to determine whether petitioner had violated the minimum wage
provisions of the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act." She alleged
that it had appeared to her, on the basis of her investigation, that
petitioner had violated the statute and that she had "reason to believe"
that employees in those plants were covered by it. However, she al-
leged no facts which would justify the court's finding of probable cause
to believe either that the plants in question were covered by the act or
that a violation existed. The district court refused to enforce the
subpoena on the ground that the Secretary had not determined that
the act covered the plants under investigation prior to her investigation
for underpayments and that, in any event, it was up to the court to
determine the question of coverage." The circuit court reversed's and
41
 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized. U.S. Const, amend. IV.
For the historical background of the Fourth Amendment see Lasson, The History and
Development of the Fourth Amendment (1937).
42 Supra note 10.
43 Supra note 34.
44 338 U.S. 632 (1950).
95 317 U.S. 501 (1943).
43
 49 Stat. 2036 (1936), as amended, 41 U.S.C. § 35-45 (1958).
47 Perkins v. Endicott Johnson Corp., 40 F. Supp. 254 (N.D.N.Y. 1941) ; Perkins v.
Endicott Johnson Corp., 37 F. Supp. 604 (N.D.N.Y, 1941).
48 Perkins v. Endicott Johnson Corp., 128 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1942). In his opinion
Judge Frank recognized the change in judicial attitudes toward more effective powers for
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the Supreme Court affirmed the reversal, holding that the district court
could not undertake to make its own determination of coverage or to
condition its enforcement of the summons on a prior determination
of coverage. Rather, the Secretary had the power to ferret out payroll
information from the plants under investigation in order to find under-
payments which might violate the act even before she had established
that those plants were in fact covered by the act.
Any doubt that Endicott Johnson Corp. was generally applicable
to investigations by other administrative agencies, and not just a rul-
ing peculiar to the Walsh-Healey Act, was set to rest three years later
in Oklahoma Press. There, the Court upheld the enforcement of a sub-
poena duces tecum issued by the Administrator of the Wage and Hour
Division of the Department of Labor seeking to enforce the Fair
Labor Standards Act. 4" The subpoena was directed to a newspaper
corporation and called for the production of corporate records. In
seeking its enforcement the Administrator had set forth only conclu-
sionary allegations asserting his belief that the act in question
covered the corporation and that the corporation had violated the act.
The now famous decision is the Court's exegesis of the effect of the
Fourth Amendment on agency subpoenas directed to business corpora-
tions. Mr. Justice Rutledge, writing for the Court, noted that a court
order enforcing an agency summons demanding the production of
books and records constitutes, at most, a constructive or figurative
search and seizure° It must not be confused with an actual search and
seizure of a man's home or with a physical taking and carrying away
of papers from a place of business. If the Fourth Amendment applies
at all, it merely requires "that the disclosure sought shall not be un-
reasonable;" there must not be "too much indefiniteness or breadth in
the things required to be 'particularly described,' if also the inquiry
is one the demanding agency is authorized by law to make and the
materials specified are relevant.' As for the requirement of "probable
cause," it "is satisfied . by the court's determination that the inves-
tigation is authorized by Congress, is for a purpose Congress can
order, and the documents sought are relevant to the inquiry."'
Four years later, in Morton Salt, the Court had occasion to re-
affirm the principles laid down in Oklahoma Press and to expand their
scope. The Federal Trade Commission had ordered Morton Salt Com-
pany, a corporation, and a number of other salt producers, plus a trade
association, to cease and desist from engaging in certain pricing, pro-
administrative agencies. Id. at 216-17. He also relied heavily upon his belief that the
administrator, as a specialist, has a "trained intuition." Id. at 221.
49 52 Slat. 1060 (1938), as amended, 29	 §§ 201-19 (1958).
50 Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, supra note 34, at 202.
51 Id. at 208.
52 Id. at 209, 216.
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ducing and marketing practices. The order was affirmed by the
court of appeals with modifications, and the respondents were ordered
to comply with the order as modified." The decree contemplated that
the FTC could initiate contempt proceedings should the respondents
violate it. A few years later, the FTC issued an order directing the
respondents to file highly particularized periodic reports designed to
assist the Commission in determining whether respondents were com-
plying with the decree. The Commission secured neither court approval
nor a modification of the decree to authorize such reports, but pur-
ported to act within the authority of the Federal Trade Commission
Act." The Morton Salt Company and another producer refused to
comply with the FTC order, and their position was vindicated by the
district court" and the court of appeals." In the Supreme Court, the
respondents argued, among other things, that the detailed demand for
information violated their rights under the Fourth Amendment and
under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Here, then, was
a case in which an administrative agency appeared to be fishing for
detailed information without a license; there was not even the conclu-
sionary allegation of a reason to suspect a violation which was present
in the Endicott Johnson and Oklahoma Press cases. Nonetheless, in
language even broader than that used in Oklahoma Press, the Court
swept aside respondents' arguments and reversed. The Court assumed,
for the purpose of argument, that the FTC was "engaged in a mere
`fishing expedition' to see if it can turn up evidence of guilt."" It
then went on to state that the investigative powers of the FTC are
much broader than those possessed by courts, which are limited to the
adjudication of cases and controversies. Rather, they are similar to
those held by a grand jury, which "can investigate merely on suspicion
that the law is being violated, or even just because it wants assurance
that it is not." 58
In the Powell case the Court quoted approvingly from Oklahoma
Press and Morton Salt, adopting the "legitimate purpose"—"rele-
vance" test for probable cause" as well as the grand jury analogy."
As to the procedure to be followed by the summons-enforcing
53 Salt Producers Ass'n v. FTC, 134 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1943).
54 38 Stat. 721 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 46(a), 46(b) (1958).
55
 United States v. Morton Salt Co., 80 F. Supp. 419 (N.D. Ill. 1948).
G United States v. Morton Salt Co., 174 F.2d 703 (7th Cir. 1949).
57 United States v. Morton Salt Co., supra note 44, at 641.
59
 Id. at 642.
59 United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964):
He [the Commissioner) must show that the investigation will be conducted
pursuant to a legitimate purpose, that the inquiry may be relevant to the purpose,
that the information sought is not already within the Commissioner's possession,
and that the administrative steps required in the Code have been followed. . . .
Id. at 57.
GO Id. at 57.
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judge in applying even the minimal Fourth Amendment standards
which are now applicable through Powell to tax investigations, the
leading case has been CAB v. Hermann. 61 There, the Civil Aeronautics
Board, engaged in an investigation of violations of the Civil Aeronau-
tics Act62 and of its own regulations, had issued subpoenas duces tecum
to individuals and entities who were connected with the airline in ques-
tion, and thus subject to the Board's control. The subpoenas had called
for a wide variety of documents in the most general terms. The parties
objected on the ground, inter alia, that the "subpoenas were vague, ex-
cessively broad in scope, and oppressive. 163 The district court took
the view that it need only compare the demand in the subpoena with
the authorized purpose of the investigation. Since the documents and
records requested did not seem to be obviously irrelevant or imma-
terial to such purpose, an order enforcing the summons was entered.
The court of appeals reversed," establishing a detailed procedure
whereby the court would be required to determine the relevance and
materiality of each document demanded before ordering compliance.
The Supreme Court, in a brief per curiam opinion, reinstated the dis-
trict court's order, expressing disapproval of the procedure required
by Judge Fee in his opinion in the court of appeals, and tacitly sanc-
tioning the non-critical approach adopted by the district judge. The
Court then noted, almost as an afterthought, that should respondents
wish to object to the relevance or materiality of any of the documents
subpoenaed, they could raise their objections when the documents
were offered in evidence at the hearing on the alleged violations. 05
In Powell, however, and in Reisman v. Caplin," another recent de-
cision involving federal tax investigations, the Court may have stepped
back somewhat from the policy of judicial abnegation which seems to
be reflected in CAB v. Hermann. In the Reisman case, taxpayers' at-
torneys brought an action against the Commissioner of Internal Rev-
enue for a declaratory judgment and for injunctive relief against the
enforcement of an Internal Revenue summons directed to accountants
hired by them. They claimed the summons unlawfully appropriated
their own work product and violated, inter alia, their clients' Fourth
and Fifth Amendment rights. The Court affirmed a dismissal of the
complaint on the ground that the petitioners had an adequate remedy
at law: the right to raise their objections before the revenue officer or
before a district judge or commissioner in a proceeding to enforce the
summons. Such a proceeding, the Court held, "would be an adversary
61 353 U.S. 322 (1957).
(2 52 Stat. 973 (1938).
63 CAB v. Hermann, supra note 61, at 323.
64 237 F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1956).
65 CAR v. Hermann, supra note 61, at 324.
06 Supra note 39.
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proceeding affording a judicial determination of the challenges to the
summons and giving complete protection to the witness."" In addition,
such challenges could be based "on any appropriate ground," and
third parties and the taxpayer could intervene to protect their own
interests . 68
In Powell the Court reinforced the position taken in Reisman.
Basing his reasoning on the power of a court to prevent an abuse of
its own processes," Mr. Justice Harlan stated: "Such an abuse would
take place if the summons had been issued for an improper purpose,
such as to harass the taxpayer or to put pressure on him to settle a col-
lateral dispute, or for any other purpose reflecting on the good faith of
the particular investigation."" He added, however, that the burden of
establishing an abuse is on the taxpayer. 71
It would seem to follow that if these newly affirmed rights of the
aggrieved parties to raise their objections to improprieties in the in-
vestigation are not to be rendered meaningless,' then the enforcing
court, in passing upon objections to the summons, must be required
to do something more than merely examine the face of the summons
to determine whether there is any ostensible authorized purpose or
whether the documents called for appear to be relevant, as would seem
to be permitted by CAB v. Hermann." Otherwise, such a minimal
standard of judicial control would hardly give "complete protection"
to parties affected by the summons.
2. The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination 74
The decision in Shapira v. United States" has given rise to wide-
spread speculation regarding the availability of the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination to individuals summoned to produce
57
 Id. at 446.
63
 Id. at 449.
" The Court cited Professor Jaffe's article, The Judicial Enforcement of Administra-
tive Orders, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 865 (1963), where the author takes the view that in enforc-
ing administrative orders a court has both the responsibility and the competence to do
justice. Thus, he argues, "a court should rarely he required ... to participate actively in
the enforcement of a judgment which it finds offensive," and may avoid doing so by
characterizing the agency's order as beyond the statutory authority or, in some cases, as an
abuse of discretion. Id. at 869.
70 United States v, Powell, supra note 59, at 58.
71 Ibid.
72
 The Court in Powell expressed the view that the adversary hearing at which
objections to enforcement of the summons can be raised is not "meaningless." Ibid.
73 If the decision in Hermann is given a narrow construction, rather than the broad
interpretation suggested here, it can be made to accommodate the stepped-up protection
called for in Powell and Rcisnran. See Note, Resisting Enforcement of Administrative
Subpoenas Duces Tecum: Another Look at CAB v. Hermann, supra note 40.
74 "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself. . ." U.S. Const. amend. V.
See generally Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 Minn. L. Rev.
1 (1949); Redlich, supra note 40.
75 Supra note 37.
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books, records and documents for examination by agents of the IRS,"
Petitioner was an individual licensed under the Emergency Price Con-
trol Act" to sell fruit and produce at wholesale. A provision of the act
empowered the Administrator to require licensees to keep detailed
records relating to the conduct of their business.' Pursuant to this
section regulations had been adopted requiring licensees such as peti-
tioner to keep detailed records of their business activities.' Another
provision of the statute offered immunity from prosecution in exchange
for compelled production of books, records and documents as well
as for compelled testimony." The records which petitioner was re-
quired to keep were summoned by the Administrator in an investiga-
tion of possible violations. The petitioner turned over the records,
acting on the belief, hardly warranted by the Administrator's com-
ments, that he would be immune from prosecution. Subsequently,
however, he was prosecuted for violating the act. He entered a plea
in bar claiming immunity from prosecution, but it was overruled and
a conviction followed. His conviction was then affirmed by the court
of appeals81
 and by the Supreme Court." Chief Justice Vinson, writing
for a closely divided Court," held that the immunity statute applied
only to compelled production of books and records which were pro-
tected by the privilege against self-incrimination. Since the records in
question were required by law to be kept, they were quasi-public
records. The Court then ruled that the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion cannot be claimed as to such records, irrespective of the fact that
their owner and possessor is an individual acting in his personal ca-
pacity.
3. Due Process"
In Hannah v. Larche," the Supreme Court gave short shrift to
claims of procedural due process under the Fifth Amendment. There,
74 Compare Meltzer, supra note 36, at 715-19, with Redlich, supra note 40, at 192-95.
77
 Emergency Price Control Act, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23 (1942).
78 Emergency Price Control Act, ch. 26, § 202, 56 Stat. 30 (1942).
78
 8 Fed. Reg. 9546, 9548-49 (1943).
80 Emergency Price Control Act, ch. 26, § 202(g), 56 Stat. 30 (1942).
81 United States v. Shapiro, 159 F.2d 890 (2d Cir. 1947).
82 Shapiro v. United States, supra note 37.
83 Justices Frankfurter, Jackson, Murphy and Rutledge dissented.
84 "No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law . . . ." U.S. Const. amend. V.
Also relevant to this discussion is the right to counsel provided by the Sixth Amend-
ment: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. Const. amend. VI.
See generally Newman, supra note 40; Rogge, supra note 30 (Pt. I); Pt. II, 48
Minn. L, Rev. 557 (1964).
85 363 U.S. 420 (1960).
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the respondents were voting registrars and private citizens summoned
to appear and testify before the Civil Rights Commission in an inves-
tigation of alleged deprivations of Negroes' voting rights. They at-
tacked the validity of rules of procedure, adopted by the Commission,
which denied to persons summoned to testify before it rights of ap-
prisal, confrontation and cross-examination. After finding that Con-
gress had authorized the Commission to adopt such rules, the Court
sustained their validity. Chief Justice Warren stated: "[T]he purely
investigative nature of the Commission's proceedings, the burden that
the claimed rights would place upon those proceedings, and the tra-
ditional procedure of investigating agencies in general, leads [sic] us
to conclude that the Commission's Rules of Procedure comport with
the requirements of due process.""
B. Congress
Mr. Justice Holmes' famous opinion in FTC v. American Tobacco
Co." recorded the Supreme Court's unwillingness to find a relaxation
of the traditional right to be free from administrative fishing expedi-
tions into private papers in the absence of a clear mandate to do so
from Congress in "the most explicit language."" In Oklahoma Press
the Court carefully examined the statutory authority and found that
the Administrator of the Fair Labor Standards Act (hereinafter
FLSA), in investigating without first establishing probable cause to
believe a violation existed, was acting in accordance with "the most
explicit language" of Congress." However, section 11(a) of the act,
which authorized the Administrator to gather data and conduct such
investigations "as he may deem necessary or appropriate to determine
whether any person has violated any provision of this Chapter,"" did
not in terms abrogate the requirement that probable cause to suspect
a violation of the act be shown prior to enforcement of a subpoena."
86 Id. at 451.
The Court also rejected respondents' claims that their Sixth Amendment rights were
violated:
Although the respondents contend that the procedures adopted by the Com-
mission also violate their rights under the Sixth Amendment, their claim does not
merit extensive discussion. That Amendment is specifically limited to "criminal
prosecutions," and the proceedings of the Commission clearly do not fall within
that category. Id. at 440 n.I6.
87 264 U.S. 298 (1924).
88
 Id. at 305-06.
88 Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 201 (1946).
80 52 Stat. 1066 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 211 (1958).
91 Similarly broad language was contained in the FTC Act which was construed in
the American Tobacco case. After directing the Commission to prevent the use of unfair
methods of competition in commerce, § 6 of the Act gave the Commission power:
(a) to gather information concerning, and to investigate the business, conduct,
practices and management of any corporation engaged in commerce,
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Furthermore, section 9 of the act" expressly adopted Section 9 of the
FTC Act" authorizing the district courts to enforce subpoenas calling
for the production of "documentary evidence"; this is language identi-
cal to that which Mr. Justice Holmes had found too wanting in explicit-
ness to justify a fishing expedition in the American Tobacco case.
Similarly, the determinations in both Oklahoma Press and Endi-
cott Johnson relative to the question of coverage—that the Administra-
tor need not show probable cause to believe the summoned party is
covered by the act before the subpoena will be enforced—were not
warranted by explicit statutory language in either case. On the con-
trary, Section 11(a) of the FLSA expressly limited the Administrator's
rights to investigate to "any industry subject to this Chapter,"" and
Section 6(a) of the FTC Act only authorized investigations "of any
corporation engaged in commerce."'
However, irrespective of the degree of explicitness of the statutory
language in both cases, it can be argued that the decisions in the
Oklahoma Press and Morton Salt cases upholding the constitutionality
of fishing expeditions seriously undermine the foundation of Holmes'
approach to the construction of statutes authorizing administrative in-
vestigations. The rule of construction which results in a refusal to
attribute to Congress "an intent to defy the Fourth Amendment or
even to come so near to doing so as to raise a serious question of con-
stitutional law" in the absence of the "most explicit language" will
except banks and common carriers, and its relation to other corporations
and individuals...
The presence of the phrase "as he may deem necessary or appropriate" in § 11(a) of
the FLSA and its absence in § 6(a) of the FTC Act would not seem to be a sufficient
basis for finding that Congress explicitly authorized judicial enforcement of subpoenas
without probable cause in FLSA cases but not in cases under the FTC Act. This argu-
ment is buttressed by the fact that subpoena enforcement, as such, is treated separately
in another section of the applicable statutes in both cases.
The questionable explicitness in these statutes becomes even more obvious when they
are compared with other statutes which contain more explicit language. See, e.g., the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 788, 792, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1482(b), 1484(b) (1958).
92 52 Stat. 1065 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 209 (1958).
93 38 Stat. 722, 723 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 49, 50 (1958).
94 52 Stat. 1066 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1958).
95 38 Stat. 721 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 46(a) (1958).
The explicitness of these statutes and the sections of the Internal Revenue Code which
are examined in the next section of this article should be compared with the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 539, 29 U.S.C. § 521(a)
(Supp. V, 1964), which provides:
The Secretary shall have power when he believes it necessary in order to determine
whether any person has violated or is about to violate any provision of this
chapter . . . to make an investigation and in connection therewith be may enter
such places and inspect such records and accounts and question such persons as
he may deem necessary to enable him to determine the facts relative thereto,
(Emphasis added.)
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obviously become inapplicable if the statute in question does not raise
serious constitutional questions."
One may conclude, therefore, that apart from possible restraints
which may be imposed by an enforcing court to prevent abuses of its
own processes, a general statutory grant of broad investigatory power
to an agency for the purpose of enforcing the act administered by it
need not be construed narrowly to limit the agency's freedom of action.
Nonetheless, it becomes relevant to inquire into the statutory
scheme for revenue investigations to ascertain what restrictions, if any,
Congress intended to impose.
1. The Statutory Authority
The basic authority of IRS officials to issue summonses for the
production of books, papers and records and the taking of testimony
is set forth in Section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. This
section expressly limits the purposes of examinations conducted under
its authority to
ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return
where none has been made, determining the liability of any
person for any internal revenue tax or the liability at law or
in equity of any transferee or fiduciary of any person in re-
spect of any internal revenue tax, or collecting any such li-
ability.
Section 7603 regulates the manner in which the summons shall be
served—in hand or at the last and usual place of abode of the person
summoned—and requires, agreeably with Oklahoma Press, that books,
papers, records or other data called for be described with reasonable
certainty.
Other restrictions are contained in section 7605. Subsection (a)
limits the time and place of examinations conducted pursuant to section
7602 by requiring that they be "reasonable under the circumstances"
and that the date fixed in the summons for appearance not be less
than ten days from the date of its issuance.
Section 7605(b) provides that:
No taxpayer shall be subjected to unnecessary examination or
investigations, and only one inspection of a taxpayer's books
of account shall be made for each taxable year unless the tax-
payer requests otherwise or unless the Secretary or his dele-
gate, after investigation, notifies the taxpayer in writing that
an additional inspection is necessary.
aEi See Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, supra note 89, at 201-14. Cf. Frank v.
Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 365 (1959).
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There are three basic methods provided in the Code for enforcing
such investigatory powers as are granted: section 7210 makes neglect
to appear or to produce summoned records after having been duly
summoned by a revenue officer authorized to issue such summons a
crime punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000, or by imprison-
ment of not more than one year. Under section 7604(b) the Service
is empowered to apply to a district judge or United States Commis-
sioner for an attachment "as for contempt" against a witness who
neglects or refuses to obey a summons. Upon a showing of "satisfactory
proof," the contumacious witness may then be arrested and brought in
for a hearing. At the hearing the judge or commissioner has power
"not inconsistent with the law of contempts, to enforce obedience to
the requirements of the summons and to punish such person for his
default or disobedience."
The mildest enforcement procedure, and the one which is most
readily available to the IRS, is the bringing of an action in the federal
district court where the summoned party resides or may be found for
an order compelling him to comply with the summons. Jurisdiction to
compel compliance "by appropriate process" is granted to the district
court by the terms of sections 7402(b) and 7604(a), which are identi-
cal, and section 7402 (a).
2. Statutory Interpretation
At the outset, it should be noted that the investigative power
granted by the Code under the sections described above seems to be
limited by section 7602 to matters relating primarily to civil liability.
Although the correctness of a return, the failure to make a return, and
the amount of tax liability may all be relevant in criminal tax prosecu-
tions, the assumption has been that this section may not be used by
officials engaged in investigations of criminal tax liability.' Apparently
this assumption is correct, since in Reisman v. Caplin the Supreme
Court held that one of the "appropriate grounds" for challenging a
revenue summons was that is was issued for the improper purpose of
gathering evidence for a criminal prosecution."
There are other questions which the language of the Code does
not purport to answer. What showing, if any, must the investigating
official make in order to have his summons enforced? The first clause
in section 7605(b) generally prohibits unnecessary examinations, but
does not indicate what constitutes "necessity." The second clause deals
97 United States v. O'Connor, 118 F. Supp. 248 (D. Mass. 1953), Sec Burns,
Searches and Seizures: The Suppression of Evidence, 20 Inst. Fed. Tax (N.Y.U.) 1081,
1087-89 (1962).
98 Supra note 39, at 449. But compare Boren v. Tucker, 239 F.2d 767, 772 (9th Cir.
1956), cited by the Court,
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only with situations in which the taxpayer's books have already been
subjected to one inspection and another is sought. It requires that the
Service, after investigation, give the taxpayer written notice that an-
other inspection is necessary. But here again there is no indication
whether the Service, if challenged, must prove either that the re-ex-
amination is necessary or that it has in fact conducted a preliminary
investigation. Furthermore, it has never been clear whether this sec-
tion is applicable only when the taxpayer himself has been summoned,
or whether it imposes general limitations on the Service which apply
alike to investigations of taxpayers and third parties."
In the Powell and Reisman cases the Supreme Court resolved
some of these problems but raised others. Reviewing the legislative
history of section 7605(b), the Powell Court concluded that the pur-
pose of Congress was merely to curb the investigatory powers of "low-
echelon revenue agents . . . by requiring such agents to clear any
repetitive examinations with a superior.'"" It is difficult to see how
the language of that section could accomplish this purpose, since there
is nothing to prevent the Secretary of the Treasury from delegating
the power to notify the taxpayer directly to the "low-echelon official."
Nonetheless, the Court's conclusions follow directly from its interpre-
tation of the legislative intent. The prohibition against unnecessary
examinations does not require a showing of probable cause to suspect
fraud even though the tax years under investigation are closed to
assessment except for fraud,' and an examination is necessary if the
Service cannot determine the existence or non-existence of fraud from
information already within its possession.'" And legislative intent
aside, to require a showing of probable cause "might seriously hamper
the Commissioner in carrying out investigations he thinks warranted,
99 Compare Hubner v. Tucker, 245 F.2d 35, 38-39 (9th Cir. 1957) (summoned party
not entitled to written notice of necessity of second examination where purpose of
examination is not to determine her personal tax liability; such third parties "have rights
of their own") with Martin v. Chandis Sec. Co., 128 F.2d 731, 735 (9th Cir. 1942)
(section of Internal Revenue Code prohibiting unnecessary examinations constitutes "a
limitation on the power of the Bureau" and not "merely a personal right available only
to the taxpayer").
These two cases are distinguishable if the first clause of § 7605(6), prohibiting un-
necessary examinations, is separable from the second clause, requiring written notice of
the necessity for a re-examination. In the Powell case, however, the Supreme Court held
that the primary purpose of the first clause "was no more than to emphasize the
responsibility of agents to exercise prudent judgment in wielding the extensive powers
granted to them by the Internal Revenue Code." Supra note 59, at 56.
ioo Supra note 59, at 55-56.
101 Id. at 56-57. The majority rejected Mr. Justice Douglas' argument in dissent
(joined by Justices Stewart and Goldberg) to the effect that the three year statute of
limitations on ordinary tax deficiencies is a "statute of repose" which imposes a minimum
standard for administrative investigation of closed years: the Service must satisfy the
enforcing court that it is not acting "capriciously" in reopening a closed year in order to
overcome the presumption that such examination is unnecessary. Id. at 59.
102 Id. at 53.
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forcing him to litigate and prosecute appeals on the very subject he
desires to investigate." 1 °3
Although the Powell case dealt with a fraud investigation in which
assessments for non-fraudulent deficiencies were barred by the statute
of limitations, the Court's rationale should apply, a fortiori, to cases
in which ordinary tax liability is being investigated.
However, the Court did not remove all limitations on the Service's
investigatory power. An investigation will be deemed "unnecessary"
if the Service already has within its possession information sufficient
to support a determination that liability does or does not exist. Pre-
sumably, this requirement might bar investigations for the purpose of
gathering information which merely duplicates information already in
the hands of the Service. In addition, the administrative steps set down
in sections 7603 and 7605(b) must be followed. Thus, the Service must
not only properly serve the summons and, in the case of a re-examina-
tion, notify the taxpayer that another examination is necessary, but
may also have to conduct an investigation of records in its possession
to determine whether the examination is necessary before sending the
notice.'"
The joker, however, is that the Court in Powell has placed the
burden of establishing a failure to fulfill the statutory requirements as
well as the burden of proving that the summons was issued for an
improper purpose upon the aggrieved party.1 °3
While it may be easy to show that no "Commissioner's letter"
was sent, that the witness was not properly served, that less than ten
days was provided between the date of the summons and the date
required for appearance, or even that the place and time set for the
examination were unreasonable, it may be extraordinarily difficult, if
not impossible, to establish other objections. Assuming that the inves-
tigating agent is the least bit sophisticated, bow will the summoned
party prove that no investigation was conducted before the written
notification of the necessity for re-examination was sent? How will
he prove that the Service already has in its possession sufficient infor-
103 Id. at 54.
1 °4 The Court held that the Commissioner
must show that the investigation will be conducted pursuant to a legitimate
purpose, that the inquiry may be relevant to the purpose, that the information
sought is not already within the Commissioner's possession, and that the
administrative steps required by the Code have been followed—in particular,
that the "Secretary or his delegate," after investigation, has determined the
further examination to be necessary and has notified the taxpayer in writing to
that effect. Id. at 57-58.
105 "The burden of showing an abuse of the court's process is on the taxpayer, and it
is not met by a mere showing, as was made in this case, that the statute of limitations for
ordinary deficiencies has run or that the records in question have already been once
examined." Id. at 58.
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mation upon which to make its determination of liability vel non? And
most importantly, how will he prove that the summons is issued for
an improper purpose?
The answer might be that the enforcement proceedings under
sections 7402(b) and 7604(a) are ordinary civil actions"° in which the
discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure"' are
available.'" The party resisting the summons can therefore acquire
the necessary information by taking depositions of tax officials and
by examining files in the possession of the IRS. Apart from possible
governmental privileges,'" however, there are at least two other diffi-
culties in connection with discovery. In the first place, the free use of
discovery by the summoned witness or an interested intervenor would
tend to do precisely what the Supreme Court is trying to avoid: it
would cause delays which might seriously hamper the Service in carry-
ing out its investigations. Secondly, at least in the case of a claim that
there was no preliminary investigation, and possibly as to the other
claims, more or less conclusionary responses to interrogatories might
have to be taken at face value.
But even if discovery is available, and even if it is effective in
bringing out the facts upon which to base an objection, the most
important question, from the aspect of "the right to be let alone," has
been left unanswered by the Reisman and Powell decisions. If the
objecting party should somehow manage to sustain the burden of prov-
ing that the investigation is being conducted for an improper purpose,
will the court or commissioner automatically refuse to enforce the
summons, or must the absence of a proper purpose also be proved?"°
The lower federal court cases which have dealt with the matter have
generally refused to enforce the summons only in cases in which a
toe United States v. Powell, supra note 59, at 58 n.18: "Because § 7604(a) contains
no provision specifying the procedure to be followed in invoking the court's jurisdiction,
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply, Martin v. Chandis Securities Co., 128 F.2d
731."
107 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
108 4 Moore, Federal Practice lig 26.05, 26.25 (1963); Fusco v. Kaase Baking Co.,
205 F. Supp. 459 (N.D. Ohio 1962).
109 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2377 (McNaughton rev. 1961); Wirtz v. Continental
Fin. & Loan Co., 326 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1964) ; Fusco v. Kaase Baking Co., supra note
108.
110 In Reisman the Court stated that the summons may be challenged "on any
appropriate ground" including the defense "that the material is sought for the improper
purpose of obtaining evidence for use in a criminal prosecution." Supra note 39, at 449.
In Powell the Court, relying on Reisman, held that a summons could be challenged if it
had been issued for an improper purpose "such as to harass the taxpayer or to put pressure
on him to settle a collateral dispute." 379 U.S. 48, 58.
In the Reisman case the Court cited only Boren v, Tucker, supra note 98, to support
its holding. In Boren, however, the court enforced the summons notwithstanding the fact
that the investigating officer might have had as one of his purposes the uncovering of
facts leading to a criminal prosecution.
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proper purpose is conspicuously absent,'" even though an improper
purpose was present.' Yet, unless the IRS official seeking enforce-
ment is naive and ingenuous, he should find it easy to make it appear
that a purpose authorized by section 7602 is present.
The solution to this problem may lie in the discretionary nature
of the enforcing court's right to deny enforcement as an abuse of its
processes. The judge or commissioner will sense the relative importance
of the improper motive in the particular case and, if he finds that such
motive predominates, he may deny relief to the IRS. Under such a
test the degree of relationship between the unauthorized purpose and
the authorized revenue purpose would undoubtedly become relevant.
If, for example, the unauthorized purpose is to find out if the taxpayer
is a Communist, or if he has violated a state criminal law, then the
summons would be quashed. But in the majority of cases where an
incidental purpose is to uncover possible criminal violations of the
tax laws, it will be enforced.
Nevertheless, in cases where the summoned party does not suspect
the presence of an improper purpose or cannot prove that it exists—
perhaps the very cases in which the Service's purposes would be most
ignoble and in which the right of privacy is in greatest danger—the
protection afforded the witness has been diminished by making it
possible for the Service to examine closed years without first marshal-
ling evidence to support a finding of probable cause."'
The availability of enforcement procedures other than by ordinary
civil action has been somewhat clarified by the opinion in the Reisman
case. Part of the justification for petitioner's claim for injunctive relief
against the Commissioner was based on the assertion that failure to
comply with the summons might result in a criminal , prosecution and
conviction under section 7210 or an arrest under section 7604 (b), and
that these penalties were sufficiently severe to amount to a denial of
judicial review." 4 To this the Court replied that the criminal sanction
provided by section 7210 is not applicable where the witness appears
and attacks the summons in good faith,'" and that attachment as for
contempt, arrest, and punishment under section 7604(b) may be in-
In United States v. O'Connor, supra note 97.
112 In re Magnus, Mabee & Reynard, Inc,, 311 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
373 U.S. 902 (1963) ; Lash v. Nighosian, 273 F.2d 185 (1st Cir. 1959), cert, denied, 362
U.S. 904 (1960). Cf. Bolich v. Rubel, 67 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1933) ; In re International
Corp. Co., 5 F. Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1934).
113 The use of the IRS as a general fact-gathering agency is obviously inhibited if
each time it seeks enforcement of a summons to examine closed years it must satisfy the
court that a reasonable ground exists to suspect fraud.
114 See Oklahoma Operating Co. v. Love, 252 U.S. 331 (1920) and Ex parte Young,
209 U.S. 123 (1908), both cited by the Court.
115 Reisman v. Caplin, supra note 39, at 447.
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yoked only against "persons who were summoned and wholly made
default or contumaciously refused to comply."'
It follows, therefore, that when the summoned party entertains
a good faith claim relating to the propriety of summons enforcement
based upon the Constitution or upon statutory limitations, as already
outlined, or upon other privileges, the only enforcement remedy avail-
able will be in the nature of a civil action under sections 7604(a) or
7402 (b ) .
The Court also made it clear that in such an action, as well as in
a case where the 7605(b) attachment procedure is utilized, the witness
may attack the summons on any appropriate ground. This right will
also extend to interested persons, including the taxpayer, who were
not summoned. They may intervene to protect their own interests.
If, after hearing objections, the enforcing court issues an order, it will
be appealable.'"
It is still not entirely clear, however, who has standing to raise
what objections. In the Powell case the summons was addressed di-
rectly to Powell, president of the taxpayer-corporation, to testify and
produce records relating to the tax liability of the corporation. Thus
it was not necessary to the decision to treat the rights of third parties
or non-summoned taxpayers. In Reisman, however, the petitioner,
taxpayers' attorney, alleged that he was seeking to protect his own
work product and trial preparation from unlawful appropriation, to
protect his own ability to fulfill his duties as an attorney to his clients,
and to protect his clients against violation of their rights and privi-
leges.' 18 The summons itself was directed to accountants hired by peti-
tioner to assist him in defending the taxpayers against civil and crimi-
nal tax proceedings. In its brief the government raised doubts about the
ability of the summoned parties to refuse to comply with the summons,
since none of their own rights were involved.' But the Court did not
have to deal with that problem because the accountants had indicated
that they would comply with the summons. Nonetheless, the approach
taken by the Court when it held that other interested parties may in-
tervene seems to suggest that each party must raise his own rights.
But who is entitled to object that the examination is for an improper
purpose? The decision in Powell would seem to support the position
that either the summoned party or anyone otherwise entitled to inter-
vene may raise that objection. If the purpose of an investigation is
improper, the court ought to be able to deny enforcement of a summons
119 Id. at 448. The Court noted, in dictum, that the use of attachment under
§ 7604(b) against a "witness who has neither defaulted nor contumaciously refused to
comply would raise constitutional considerations ... ." Id. at 448 n.8.
117 Id. at 449.
118 Brief for Petitioner, p. 3.
119 Brief for Respondents, pp. 10, 27.
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and thus prevent an abuse of its own processes at the behest of any
interested party; the problem may thus become a matter of sound
judicial adrninistration. 120
Apart from the propriety of the purpose, however, other objec-
tions which might arise under 7604(b), relating to necessity, would
seem to be exclusively those of a summoned taxpayer and not available
either to a summoned third party or to a taxpayer intervening in an
action in which he himself was not summoned. Although it is cer-
tainly not conclusive, the legislative history of section 7604(b), quoted
in Powell, seems to support this construction.'
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S TREATMENT OF
ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATIONS
By its decision in Powell, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the
judicial power to control the abuse by federal tax investigators of their
enforcement powers, and has thus attempted to react against the fre-
quent claim that the courts were nothing more than rubber stamps. It
has already been suggested, however, that the Court's reading of the ap-
plicable tax statutes to provide only technical protection, coupled with
its view that the objecting party bears the burden of proving that the
summons ought not to be enforced, may have had precisely the opposite
effect. It now remains to be seen what additional protection, if any, is
provided by the major constitutional decisions described earlier.
A. The Fourth Amendment
There is a serious doubt, echoed in Oklahoma Press,'" whether
the protection of the Fourth Amendment applies at all to the "figura-
tive" searches and seizures engaged in by administrative investigators
when the privilege of self-incrimination is not available. The opinion
in the landmark case of Boyd v. United States' pointed out the
relationship between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, and suggested
that it was the use of a man's private papers to incriminate him, in
violation of the Fifth Amendment, which made the demanded produc-
tion an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth.'" The require-
ments of this relationship have been carried over into later decisions,' 25
120 Cf. Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 225 (1946) ; Johnson v, Yellow
Cab Transit Co., 321 U.S. 383, 393 (1944) (Mr. Justice Frankf urter, dissenting).
121 United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 54-55 (1964),
122 Supra note 89, at 208.
125 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
124 Id. at 630, 633.
125 Frank v. Maryland, supra note 96; Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, supra
note 89, at 205.
In Frank the Court noted that the history of the Fourth Amendment showed that it
was designed to prevent searches for incriminating evidence, but indicated that the
protection it affords today is not necessarily restricted within historical bounds. Supra
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although none of these have expressly involved administrative investi-
gations. If applicable, however, the consequences would be that if no
danger of self-incrimination were present, then the Fourth Amendment
protections, limited as they are, would be inapplicable.
Assuming, however, that some Fourth Amendment protection is
available, the essence of that protection in tax investigations is that
the demand for an examination should not be unreasonable. 120 As in
other situations in the law where reasonableness is the applicable stan-
dard, what is or is not reasonable cannot be answered by a litmus
paper test which will give a sure result in every case. Rather, each
determination must be based on the facts and circumstances of the
particular case. However, by examining the leading decisions, it is
possible to delineate several guidelines, of varying degrees of general-
ity, which will aid in this determination. Thus, whether the enforce-
ment of an agency summons calling for the production of documents
will violate Fourth Amendment rights is made to depend on the answers
to these five questions: (1) whether the investigation is for a purpose
Congress can order;' 27
 (2) whether the investigation is authorized by
Congress; 128
 (3) whether the summoned documents are described with
sufficient particularity; "° (4) whether the documents sought are rele-
vant and material to the investigation ; 1" and (5) whether compliance
with the summons will impose an unreasonable burden on the sum-
moned party. 13 ' Affirmative answers to questions (1) through (4) and
a negative answer to question (5) will justify judicial enforcement of
the summons under the Fourth Amendment, notwithstanding the ab-
sence of a specific showing of probable cause.'"
As to question (1), it is already beyond dispute that Congress
can authorize the Service to conduct investigations for the purposes
set forth in Section 7602 of the Code.'" And, since it is ordinarily the
note 96, at 366. See Stanford v. Texas, 85 Sup. Ct. 506, 511 (1965) where the Court
quotes approvingly from Mr. Justice Douglas' dissent in Frank.
123 Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, supra note 89, at 208.
127 Id. at 209. See United States v. Powell, supra note 121, at 57.
123 United States v. Powell, supra note 121; Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling,
supra note 89, at 209.
12a Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Wailing, supra note 89. The same requirement is
imposed by statute. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 7603.
13° Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, supra note 89, at 204.
131 Id. at 208. See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652-53 (1950);
McMann v. SEC, 87 F.2d 377, 379 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 684 (1937).
132 When the summons only calls for oral testimony the Fourth Amendment would
not seem to apply. In any event, probable cause will be dispensed with if affirmative
answers to questions (1) and (2) are given, if the testimony sought is relevant and
material to the investigation, and if the other statutory requirements, enumerated in the
Powell case, are satisfied. Supra note 121, at 57-58. See also Application of United
States (Carroll), 246 F.2d 762, 765 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 857 (1957), a pre-
Powell case.
133 See United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 295 Fed. 142 (D. Ala. 1924), aff'd mem.,
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principal occupation of the agent seeking enforcement to perform
these functions, nothing more than the presentation of the investiga-
tor's credentials, coupled with an easily established assertion that he
is fulfilling one of the statutory purposes, will result in an affirmative
answer to question (2). 1"
With respect to question (3), specificity of description, the courts
generally recognize that the investigating agency cannot always be
expected to know which documents will shed light on the taxpayer's
liability before the documents are actually examined."' Therefore,
courts may permit the Service to throw the onus of producing all rele-
vant documents on the person served by demanding, in general terms,
all books, records and documents relating to the taxpayer's liability
for specified years or to the particular transaction in question.'" This
practice would seem to meet the general standard set forth in the
Oklahoma Press case requiring "specification of the documents to be
produced adequate, but not excessive, for the purposes of the relevant
inquiry." 57
 Furthermore, by virtue of CAB v. Hermann, it is not
necessary, as some courts had suggested, 138
 for the investigating agent
first to interrogate witnesses to ascertain which specific documents and
records shed light on the taxpayer's liability, and then to limit the
subpoena duces tecum to those specific documents."'
Whether the Service must have specific taxpayers in mind and
list their names in the summons, or whether it can issue a summons
to a third party and demand an examination of all books and records
relating to financial transactions with any taxpayer in order to uncover
unreported income or the failure to file an income tax return, is dis-
cussed below."° Suffice it to say here that a "fishing expedition" not
267 U.S. 576 (1925). The relevant parts of § 7602 are quoted in the text at Pt. II1(B) (1),
supra.
134 In re Keegan, 18 F. Supp. 746, 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
135 In re International Corp. Co., supra note 112; Cooley v. Bergin, 27 F.2d 930
(D. Mass. 1928). Cf. McPhaul v. United States, 364 U.S. 372, 382 (1960).
1311
 Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734, 736 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
864 (1953) ("Alt books, papers, records or memoranda in your files relating to (1) indi-
vidual . . . returns [of taxpayers] . . . for the years 1940 to 1946, inclusive. (2) Corpora-
tion . . returns of [named corporation] . . . for the years 1940 to 1951, inclusive.")
See also In re International Corp. Co., supra note 112 ; Cooley v. Bergin, supra note 135.
Cf. Stanford v. Texas, supra note 125, at 512 n.14; Brown v. United States, 276 U.S.
134, 142-43 (1928) ; Goldberg v. Local 299, Teamsters, 293 F.2d 807 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 938 (1961).
187 Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, supra note 89, at 209; In re Magnus,
Mabee & Reynard, Inc., supra note 112, at 17. Cf. McPhaul v. United States, supra
note 135.
188 Hubner v. Tucker, supra note 99; Local 174, Teamsters v. United States, 240
F.2d 387 (9th Cir. 1956); First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 160 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1947).
139 In re Magnus, Mabee & Reynard, Inc., supra note 112, at 17. Of course this
assumes that the thrust of Hermann has not been limited by the Powell case. See text at
note 66, supra.
140 See text at notes 150-65, infra.
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related to particular taxpayers would probably not violate the "specifi-
city" requirement if the summons were otherwise limited to transac-
tions for specified years and to specified types of documents. However,
as will be seen,' such an examination might be deemed to constitute
an "unreasonable burden" if it caused the third party unusual hardship
by way of expense or business disruption.
The fourth factor—relevance and materiality—merely requires
a showing that the records sought might shed light on the questions
which are the authorized purpose of the investigation.'" If the de-
scription of the documents is couched in general terms, such as "all
records relating to the tax liability of taxpayer for 1964," then the
relevance and materiality of the documents sought will be obvious from
the face of the summons. But, even if the summons lists specific docu-
ments, or classes of documents, CAB v. Hermann, if held applicable,
releases the order-enforcing judge from any duty to examine the re-
quested documents himself; he may make the determination of rele-
vance and materiality by reference only to the description of the
documents in the summons. He is then empowered to enforce the
summons, unless a connection between the requested records and the
authorized tax purpose is conspicuously absent,' and objections to
the production of particular documents included in a category of
summoned records which meet the loose requirements outlined above
will not be heard.'" Under the circumstances one might predict that
correspondence of a highly personal nature, not otherwise privileged,
might be subject to examination by the Internal Revenue Service, if
written to anyone with whom the witness might have had financial
dealings.'"
The fifth factor—whether the requested examination will impose
an unreasonable burden on the summoned party—is broad enough to
141 See text at notes 161-65, infra.
142 In re International Corp. Co., supra note 112.
148
 In the trial judge's "memorandum for order" in the Hermann case, the judge
justified the enforcement order by stating:
In laying the subpoenas along side the charges in the Complaint, this Court
cannot say that any of the documents or things called for in any of the subpoenas
are immaterial or irrelevant to the proceedings before the Board, without an
examination of all the documents and things themselves, which this Court is not
called upon to do at this state of the proceedings.
See Hermann v. CAB, 237 F.2d 359, 362 (9th Cir. 1956).
Of course, in the rare case where there is no apparent connection between the docu-
ments described in the summons and any authorized purpose of the investigation, the
judge called upon to enforce the summons will probably have to find a connection before
he issues the enforcing order.
144 CAB v. Hermann, 353 U.S. 322 (1957). Cf. Foster v. United States, 265 F.2d
183 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 912 (1959).
141 Indeed, in the Hermann case itself some of the persons whose records were
summoned claimed that some of those records related solely to their personal affairs.
Hermann v. CAB, supra note 143, at 361.
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encompass all the prior factors. For example, it is possible to character-
ize an unauthorized examination, or any examination which calls for
documents which are irrelevant or immaterial to any authorized pur-
pose of the investigation, as constituting an unreasonable burden on
the summoned party. However, the fifth factor also has significance
independent of the other four factors. For the purposes of this dis-
cussion, therefore, it will be assumed that the requirements of those
four have been met.
Two separate elements, often closely related, will determine
whether a given examination constitutes an unreasonable burden. The
first is disproportionality: is the requested examination out of propor-
tion to the ends sought? The second is hardship: are the requirements
of the summons unreasonably onerous? As to the former element, there
are two types of disproportionality which may be the basis for holding
that a proposed examination constitutes an "unreasonable burden"
on the summoned party. The first type is the garden variety, where
compliance with the summons may require the production of a greater
quantity of documents, or may cause more inconvenience, than is
necessary or even useful in fulfilling the investigation's authorized
purpose.' 46
 The second type is more broadly based on the policy of
the Fourth Amendment; though the purposes or ends of the requested
examination be perfectly proper, the scope or breadth of the summons
may be so sweeping that it resembles the prohibited general warrant."'
Here the disproportionality relates not only to the purposes of the
particular investigation, but also to the amount of inquisitorial power
placed in the hands of the administrative agent vis-a-vis the rights
of citizens in a democratic society.
Frequently, both elements will appear together. That is, the
existence of disproportionality, especially of the first type, may work
a real hardship by way of expense or inconvenience on the summoned
party.148
 For discussion purposes, however, the two elements will be
treated separately.
When the demand made requires the production of more docu-
ments than are necessary or useful in order to accomplish the author-
ized purpose, or when compliance with the summons will expose the
summoned party to more inconvenience or business disruption than
146
 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 122 F.2d 450, 453 (6th Cir. 1941)
(subpoenas demanding 600,000 employee cards which necessarily contained "a vast
amount of irrelevant material" held to be out of proportion to the end sought.) Cf. CAB
v. Hermann, supra note 144, at 323 (One of the reasons given for upholding the order
enforcing the subpoenas was that it contained "appropriate provisions for assuring the
minimum interference with the conduct of the business of respondents") ; United States
v. United Distillers Prods. Corp., 156 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1946).
147 McMann v. SEC, supra note 131. Cf. Stanford v. Texas, supra note 125; Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906).
148 See United States v. United Distillers Prods. Corp., supra note 146.
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is necessary for the accomplishment of the authorized purpose, the
enforcing judge will be justified either in refusing to enforce the sum-
mons as written, or in modifying it by enforcing only those require-
ments which are necessary or useful, but not excessive, in relation to
the examination's authorized purpose.'" However, as the scope of the
examination is expanded, the demand may appear to become less ex-
cessive. Thus, the Service, by manipulating the scope or breadth of a
summons issued for a purpose authorized by statute, may make it
appear that the requirements of compliance are not out of proportion
to the ends sought.'"
Of course, the following question then arises: with how much
generality can the investigator state the scope or breadth of his exam-
ination? It is here that the second type of disproportionality becomes
relevant. Is it possible for the Service to request an examination based
only on one or more of the statutory purposes, without having particu-
lar taxpayers, particular tax years, or particular transactions in mind?
In Judge Learned Hand's famous opinion in McMann v. SEC,"' it
was suggested that if "the person served is required to fetch all his
books at once to an exploratory investigation whose purpose and limits
can be determined only as it proceeds" then the investigation would
constitute a "fishing excursion" which would be "out of proportion to
the end sought" and "so onerous as to constitute an unreasonable
search.'"52 When tax summonses are tested against this standard, it can
be argued that (based on the earlier assumption) the general statutory
purpose is always known in advance. Thus, unless Judge Hand's test
includes the unstated requirement that the specific purpose or specific
limits of the investigation be known in advance, e.g., that the examina-
tion is being conducted to determine the tax liability of taxpayer X, the
tax liability of taxpayer X for years certain, or the tax liability of tax-
payer X with respect to transaction Y, then, for all practical purposes,
no tax investigations would seem to fall within its prohibition. With re-
spect to the need to pinpoint particular transactions which are suspect,
however, Endicott Johnson, Oklahoma Press, Morton Salt, and Powell
hold that, at least in cases where the summoned party is under investi-
gation as to possible statutory or rule violations on his own part, the
investigating agency need have no specific transaction in mind. Fur-
149 In re International Corp. Co., supra note 112. See Brody v. United States, 243
F.2d 378, 384-85 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 923 (1957) ; Falsone v. United States,
supra note 136, at 739; First Nat'l Bank v. United States, supra note 138.
150 Cf. McPhaul v. United States, supra note 135, at 382: "The Subcommittee's
inquiry here was a relatively broad one . . . and the permissible scope of materials that
could reasonably be sought was necessarily equally broad."
151 Supra note 131.
152 Id. at 379.
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thermore, in the Powell case, the Court approved and restated the lan-
guage of Morton Salt:
It [the administrative agency] has a power of inquisition, if
one chooses to call it that, which is not derived from the judi-
cial function. It is more analogous to the Grand Jury, which
does not depend on a case or controversy for power to get
evidence but can investigate merely on suspicion that the
law is being violated, or even just because it wants assurance
that it is not.'
Carrying this analogy forward, the failure to specify a particular
transaction would not seem to be fatal to summons enforcement in
a third-party investigation of named taxpayers,' although, as shall
be seen, the hardship feature of such an investigation may impose
limitations on the scope of the inquiry which are not present if the
summons is addressed directly to the taxpayer.
As to the need to specify and limit the tax years under investiga-
tion, the leading decisions shed less light. However, by applying the
grand jury analogy, it may be suggested that the Internal Revenue
Service can investigate any and all tax years. Therefore, even assuming
that the McMann test would result in a refusal to enforce a summons
which was not limited in terms to specific transactions or to specific
tax years, as a practical matter the Service could overcome this objec-
tion simply by setting forth in the summons any years in which it had
an interest.
A more difficult question is raised, however, in the case of a
third-party investigation where the agency does not have named per-
sons in mind. This might include the situation, for example, where the
summons is directed to a bank demanding the opportunity to examine
all of the bank's records relating to deposits and withdrawals by all
customers. Hardship aside, does such an examination constitute an
unreasonable "fishing excursion?" Here, unlike the prior situations,
the general statutory purpose is not qualified by reference to particular
taxpayers. In McMann and in all of the leading decisions, the investi-
gations were limited to possible violations by particular parties; thus,
these cases shed no light on the question. While language in a 1934 tax
investigation case, In re International Corp. Co.,' 55
 seems to suggest
that a third-party investigation of unnamed taxpayers would violate
the Fourth Amendment, the grand jury analogy would seem to call for
1" Supra note 131, at 642-43. Accord, United States v. Powell, supra note 121, at 57.
154 Cf. De Masters v. Arend, 313 F.2d 79 (9th Cir.), appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 936
(1963) ; In re Magnus, Mabee & Reynard, Inc., supra note 112.
155 Supra note 112, at 612. See Hubner v. Tucker, supra note 99, at 41.
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a contrary conclusion.' Thus, it cannot be said with certainty that
such examinations are proscribed. Furthermore, it is still doubtful
whether the rights of the unnamed or unknown taxpayers can be as-
serted by the third party when his records are summoned, especially
where there is no confidential relationship between the taxpayer and
the summoned party.'" Therefore, it may only be open to the sum-
moned party to complain that his own rights are being infringed, and,
absent a showing that the investigation works an unreasonable hard-
ship on him, it is unlikely that he will be able to complain that the
investigation is not limited to the liability of named persons. The fact
that the third party would like to protect the dealings of his customers
from agency scrutiny has already been held not to be a basis for
denying enforcement of the summons."
Although the McMann prohibition against disproportionality may
not provide any limitations on the Service in the ordinary situation, it
may not be a dead letter. Even the Oklahoma Press and Morton Salt
cases indicate that there are some limitations on the breadth or sweep
of administrative agency summonses. In the former, the Court sug-
gested that if a subpoena were too broad or too indefinite, it might take
on the aspect of a general warrant or writ of assistance, thus violating
the Fourth Amendment." In the latter, the Court noted that "a gov-
ernmental investigation . . . may be of such a sweeping nature and so
unrelated to the matter properly under inquiry as to exceed the inves-
tigatory power."'" Perhaps, then, a summons which is not addressed to
specific addressees, but authorizes the Service to inspect books and
records of any person or firm, or even specified classes of persons or
firms, would so closely resemble the prohibited general warrant that
it would not be enforced." 1
156
 In issuing subpoenas and in questioning witnesses, the grand jury need not have
particular violators in mind. Hale v. Henkel, supra note 147.
157 Cf. De Masters v. Arend, supra note 154, at 85, and cases cited therein; In re
Magnus, Mabee & Reynard, Inc., supra note 112; Application of Magnus, 299 F.2d 335
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 918 (1962) ; Foster v. United States, supra note 144;
Hubner v. Tucker, supra note 99; McMann v. SEC, supra note 131; First Nat'l Bank v.
United States, supra note 138; In re Andrews, 18 F. Supp. 804 (D. Md. 1937) ; In re
Upham's Income Tax, 18 F. Supp. 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1937) ; Caplis v. Helvering, 4 F. Supp.
181 (E.D.N.Y. 1933) ; Cooley v. Bergin, supra note 135. But cf. Reisman v. Caplin, supra
note 39; In re Albert Lindley Lee Memorial Hosp., 209 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1953) ; Falsone
v. United States, supra note 136; In re International Corp. Co., supra note 112.
As to the availability of common law privileges see Fahey, Testimonial Privilege of
Accountants in Federal Tax Investigations, 17 Tax L. Rev. 491 (1962); Lofts, The
Attorney-Client Privilege in Federal Tax Investigations, 19 Tax L. Rev. 405 (1964) ;
Comment, The Attorney and His Client's Privileges, 74 Yale L.J. 539 (1965). See
generally 8 Wigmore, supra note 109, at ch. 82.
118 United States v. First Nat'l Bank, supra note 133.
159 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
160 Supra note 131, at 652.
161 Hale v. Henkel, supra note 147, at 76. But cf. Stanford v. Texas, supra note 125,
at 512 n.14.
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The next question relates to the effect of hardship. Assuming that
neither of the two types of disproportionality is present, will a re-
quested examination be deemed to constitute an "unreasonable burden"
on the summoned party if it will cause him hardship? In discussing
this question, the status of the party summoned may become relevant.
If he is the person whose tax liability is under investigation, a showing
of hardship, even great hardship, may not justify a refusal to enforce;
the hardship will probably not be deemed to create an unreasonable
burden unless it is related to one of the factors already discussed.'
However, as to third parties whose own liability is not under investiga-
tion, the possibility of hardship may provide some additional protec-
tion. There may be many situations in which great hardship caused
by business disruption or expense resulting from compliance with the
summons will be present. 163 Unlike the taxpayer, the third party is
not ordinarily bound to submit to such hardship; he must cooperate
with the Service, but he cannot be called upon to make any unusual
sacrifice. Just when the burden imposed will be deemed unreasonable,
however, will depend upon the facts of the particular case.'
Serious consequences to the individual's long-standing protection
against actual, as well as against figurative searches and seizures may
flow from the decision in Shapiro v. United States.'" Mr. Justice
Frankfurter suggested the possibilities in his vigorous dissent. If the
records required to be kept are public records, he stated, "[T]he
Government should be able to enter a man's home to examine or seize
such public records, with or without a search warrant, at any time. If
an individual should keep such records in his home, as millions do,
instead of his place of business, why is not his home for some purposes
and in the same technical sense, a 'public' library?"' That Mr. Jus-
tice Frankfurter clearly had in mind records required to be kept under
the Internal Revenue Code and Treasury regulations when he wrote
the quoted lines is evident from the fact that he cited these authorities
in the prior paragraph of his opinion.
B. The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
Well-established principles limit the availability of the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to individuals who
162 E.g., Hale v. Henkel, supra note 147 at 77 (hardship plus lack of particularity).
But cf. Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, supra note 159, at 217 ("There is no
harassment when the subpoena is issued and enforced according to law.") and compare
with Bolich v. Rubel, 67 F.2d 895 (2d Cir. 1933) (The court can probably prevent "plain
oppression.")
163 Cf. United States v. United Distillers Prods. Corp., supra note 146.
164 An
 entity operating under a government franchise, for example, may have a
greater duty to submit to onerous investigation than a private individual. Cf. Cooley v.
Bergin, supra note 135.
165 335 U.S. 1 (1948), discussed in text at note 75, supra.
166 Id. at 54-55.
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wish to avoid incriminating themselves by their own oral testimony
or by producing private papers and documents held by them in a
personal capacity. 107
 The thrust of the Shapiro doctrine is to limit fur-
ther the availability of the privilege by taking written materials out of
the ambit of its protection if they are required by law to be kept.'"
In the area of revenue investigations, the impact of this doctrine is
devastating. The record keeping requirements of the Internal Revenue
Code and the tax regulations are extremely broad and general. With
the exception of farmers and wage earners, all persons either subject
to the income tax, or required to file information returns, must keep
"permanent books of account or records, including inventories, as are
sufficient to establish the amount of gross income, deductions, credits,
or other matters required to be shown by such person in any return
of such tax or information" so long as these records "may become ma-
terial in the administration of any internal revenue law. 116° Farmers
and "individuals whose gross income includes salaries, wages, or similar
compensation for personal services rendered" must keep "such records
as will enable the district director to determine the correct amount of
income subject to the tax" for the same indefinite period.'" Under
the circumstances, although a narrower interpretation is possible,
practically every record or document which sheds light on taxable in-
come may be deemed a record required by law to be kept."' This would
seem to include, among other things, checks, bank statements, records
of gambling winnings and losses, receipts for all deductible expenses,
correspondence relating to taxable transactions, records of automobile
mileage, and any number of like items which record the everyday
economic life of the taxpayer.'" Under the Shapiro doctrine, the re-
cipient would have to deliver up any of these things upon demand by
the Service, irrespective of the incriminating nature of the item de-
107 See generally 8 Wigmore, supra note 109, at ch. 80; Redlich, Searches, Seizures,
and Self-Incrimination in Tax Cases, 10 Tax L. Rev. 191 (1954).
1" See generally Meltzer, Required Records, The McCarran Act, and the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 18 U. Chi. L. Rev. 687 (1951).
1112 Guide to Record Retention Requirements, 29 Fed. Reg. 3029, 3055 (1964) ; Int.
Rev. Code of 1954, § 6001.
170
 Ibid.
171 See, e.g., United States v. Clancy, 276 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1960), rev'd on other
grounds, 365 U.S. 312 (1961) (records kept by gamblers "reflecting transactions carried
on in the course of a taxable wagering activity") ; United States v. Boccuto, 175 F. Supp.
886, 889 (D.N.J.), appeal dismissed, 274 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1959) (accountant's work
papers) ; United States v. Willis, 145 F. Supp. 365 (M.D. Ca. 1955) (records relating to
wagers). But cf. Application of House, 144 F. Supp. 95, 103 (ND. Cal. 1956)
(accountant's work papers held not to be required records under Shapiro doctrine).
172 Apparently, if there is fraud, the taxpayer must keep the records permanently,
since there is no statute of limitation to bar assessment for fraud, and since the records
must be kept so long as they "may become material in the administration of any internal
revenue law."
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nrianded." Thus, the privilege in tax investigations would be relegated
to the protection of oral testimony and to the residue of written ma-
terial held by the witness which sheds no light on the amount of tax
liability. And, as to the latter, the privilege may not be available be-
cause of record keeping requirements in statutes and regulations other
than the Internal Revenue Code.'"
C. Due Process Rights
No serious change in practice would result should the witnesses
be found to have no rights of apprisal, confrontation and cross-ex-
amination in Internal Revenue investigations because of the applica-
tion of Hannah v. Larche. 175 Generally speaking, the courts have taken
the view that the witness under investigation by tax agents in a routine
audit has no right to be apprised that the examination is for the purpose
of uncovering criminal tax violations, or for other unauthorized pur-
poses, nor is he entitled to any warning that he may incriminate him-
self.'" It is only when the agents have deliberately used deceit, fraud,
or force to gain the witness's cooperation that the courts have sup-
pressed the evidence obtained thereby.' Thus, the absence of a right
to apprisal will cause practically no change in the existing approach.
As to the confrontation of accusers and cross-examination of witnesses,
summoned parties have rarely claimed such rights in tax investigations.
Rather, the claim usually is that the witness is entitled to the presence
of counsel when he appears in compliance with the summons and,
occasionally, that other persons be present.'" The courts have gen-
erally honored his request for counsel, although they do not favor the
presence of the other persons.' The right to confront accusers and
to cross-examine adverse witnesses is fully protected in the trials
wherein civil or criminal tax liability is adjudicated, or when the
summoned party is tried either for contempt or under the statute im-
posing criminal penalties for failure to obey the summons.
173 See United States v. Clancy, supra note 171; Beard v. United States, 222 F.2d 84
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 846 (1955) ; Falsone v. United States, supra note 136,
at 739. Compare Application of Daniels, 140 F. Supp. 322, 325-26 n.2 (S.D,N.Y. 1956).
174 See generally Guide to Record Retention Requirements, supra note 169.
175 363 U.S. 420 (1960), discussed in text at note 85, supra.
176 Redlich, Searches, Seizures, and Self-Incrimination in Tax Cases, supra note 167,
at 204-09.
177
 Ibid. Burns, Searches and Seizures: The Suppression of Evidence, 20 Inst. of
Fed. Tax (N.Y.U.) 1081 (1962).
178 See, e.g., Torras v. Stradley, 103 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Ga. 1952) (counsel and
stenographer).
179 Ibid. In Torras the court refused to allow the witness' stenographer to be
present, or to allow the witness to use the same counsel used by the taxpayer under
investigation, but the right to counsel was recognized. Also see Backer v. Commissioner,
275 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1960) and Rogge, Inquisitions by Officials: A Study of Due
Process Requirements in Administrative Investigations-I, 47 Minn. L. Rev. 939, 945
(1963).
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It can be argued, however, that the reverse implication of Hannah
might require the allowance of these rights in tax investigations. That
is, if such investigations may be deemed adjudicative under the criteria
established in Hannah, and not purely fact-finding," then it is argu-
able that witnesses summoned in tax investigations must be apprised of
possible criminal charges against them and must also have the right
to confront and cross-examine informers. However, the last two rights
would prove so disruptive of the process of investigation that they
might not seem warranted under the balancing of interests approach
to due process adopted in the Hannah decision. On the other hand, the
right of apprisal, which does not cause an actual disruption of the
procedure of the investigation, might henceforth be required for wit-
nesses being investigated for their own crimes."' Even so, the knowl-
edge that he was being investigated for purposes other than his civil
tax liability would be of limited importance to a witness if his ability
to assert constitutional protection is circumscribed by the application
of the decisions discussed earlier.
Subject only to the possible interposition of common law privi-
leges,' it would seem safe to conclude that the catalogue of last-ditch
defenses available to parties seeking to resist tax summonses, especially
those calling for the production of books and records, is fairly meager.
The statutory protections are mostly technical; the constitutional safe-
guards are available only to ward off the most outrageous and obvious
abuses; and the recently affirmed judicial power to refuse to enforce
summonses issued for improper purposes is crippled by imposing the
burden of proof upon the parties, who may be ill-equipped to sustain
it. When it was argued in Oklahoma Press that turning the courts into
rubber stamps abased or abused the judicial function, the Supreme
Court replied that the courts still retained the power to decide im-
portant questions relating to summons enforcement. It noted that "the
issues of authority to conduct the investigation, relevancy of the ma-
terials sought, and breadth of the demand are neither minor nor minis-
terial matters."'" The fact is, however, that in tax investigations these
issues may have become ministerial or minor. To the extent that zealous
revenue agents may frame wide-ranging summonses, valid on their face,
for a variety of purposes other than those expressly authorized by the
Code and have them uncritically enforced, the summoned party stands
naked before the government agency, stripped of judicial protection.
For all practical purposes the famous dictum in /CC v. Brimson'
180
 See discussion in text infra following note 224.
181 Cf. Escobcdo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
182
 See note 157, supra. Also see Comment, 31 U. Chi. L. Rev. 395 (1964).
188
 Supra note 159, at 217 n.57.
184 154 U.S. 447, 485 (1894).
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denying the right of an administrative agency to compel obedience to
its own orders is a dead letter.
V. ALTERNATIVES TO ACCOMMODATE COMPETING POLICIES
In light of the conclusions just adduced, the potential danger to
the collective security from relatively uninhibited investigatory powers
ought not to be minimized. Rather, it would seem prudent to attempt
to fashion new approaches which will prevent the undesired results
from occurring but which will not seriously interfere with the per-
formance of the legitimate functions of the Service.'" The alternatives
discussed here include both legislative and judicial proposals. The ap-
plicability of the techniques used for framing such alternatives is not
limited to the IRS.
A. Granting Wider Protection to Individuals
The common thread which runs through the Endicott Johnson,
Oklahoma Press, Morton Salt, and Powell cases is the fact that the
entities under investigation for possible statutory violations were
corporations. In each case the subpoenas calling for the production of
books and records were addressed either to corporate officers or di-
rectly to the corporation itself, and the subpoenas called for the pro-
duction of corporate records. Is it not possible, therefore, to limit their
thrust, as well as their facts, to investigations of corporations and,
perhaps, of large impersonal organizations? Indeed, there is language
in Oklahoma Press' and Morton Salt's' which, harkening back to
Wilson v. United States,' stresses the power which Congress possesses
over such organizations. The clear implication of this language is that
private individuals are entitled to special protection.
Furthermore, it has long been settled that the privilege against
self-incrimination is a personal privilege of private individuals.'" If
Fourth Amendment protection from constructive searches and seizures
depends upon the availability of the Fifth Amendment privilege,'" it
follows that such protection is only available to private individuals.
There are several factors, however, which militate against the
suggested limitation.
185 See Judge Swan's concurring opinion in United States v. United Distillers Prods.
Corp., supra nate 146, at 875:
In these days when Government has to conduct so many investigations of
private business, it is important that oppressive interference by governmental
agents be as limited as is reasonably consistent with the public interest.
188 Supra note 159, at 204-06.
187 338 U.S. 632, 652-53 (1950).
188 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
180 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2259a (McNaughton rev. 1961, Supp. 1964). See Wild v.
Brewer, 329 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1964) ; Note, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 455 (1964). But see
Comment, The Attorney and His Client's Privileges, supra note 157.
190 See note 125, supra.
697
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
In the first place, Morton Salt, Oklahoma Press, and Powell con-
tain references which seem to brook no exception for individuals. In all
three cases the Court had occasion to set forth the broad powers of
administrative agencies, likening their powers to those of grand juries
—inquisitional bodies which may investigate merely to assure them-
selves that the law is not being violated.' No language attempted to
limit the analogy to investigations of corporations or impersonal asso-
ciations. In addition, the Court has equated the investigatory power
of the administrative agency with that of a court issuing orders for pre-
trial discovery.'" Of course, the mere existence of such references is
not conclusive. Insofar as they extend the application of the decisions
to individuals, they may be treated as dicta. However, it is very
difficult to ignore them, since they reflect an extremely permissive
philosophy on the Court's part as to the purposes and needs of admin-
istrative agencies.
Secondly, the decision in CAB v. Hermann"' seems to reject the
notion that private records held in a personal capacity are entitled
to special protection. In the court of appeals opinion, Judge Fee, writ-
ing for the court, expressly distinguished between records held by
entities and by individuals subject to the control of the CAB and docu-
ments held by private parties relating entirely to their personal affairs.
As to the former, he stated: "[T]he showing as to materiality and
relevancy might not necessarily be as comprehensive as that required
in other cases."' As to the latter: "[T]he court should protect the
privacy of the individuals as against the encroachment of administra-
tive bodies.'""
However, in reversing the court of appeals and reinstating the
district court order directing compliance with the subpoenas, the Su-
preme Court, in its somewhat cryptic per curiam decision, did not
see fit to discuss the claim of special treatment for personal documents
held by private individuals; no distinction was drawn between the
types of documents called for. In light of this fact, plus the Court's
citation of Endicott Johnson and Oklahoma Press in support of its
opinion,'" it may be concluded that the Court was treating the broad
holding of these cases as applicable to individuals, as to others, without
101 United States v. Morton Salt Co., supra note 187, at 642-43 (The Court in this
section of the opinion was concerned only with the question whether the FTC's order
infringed on the jurisdiction of the court of appeals.) ; Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v.
Walling, supra note 159, at 216 (The Court quoted from Blair v. United States, 250 U.S.
273 (1919), which involved a grand jury subpoena directed to an individual in his
capacity as such.) ; United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57 (1964).
102 Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, supra note 159.
las 353 U.S. 322 (1957).
194 Hermann v. CAB, 237 F.2d 359, 363 (9th Cir. 1956).
195 Ibid.
MI Supra note 193, at 324.
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qualification. It is suggested, however, that this interpretation carries
the decision too far. In the first place, no questions of "probable cause"
or "coverage" were before the Court. Secondly, the only objections of
which the Court took cognizance were that "the subpoenas were vague,
excessively broad in scope, and oppressive" and that the Board had
failed to comply with the detailed procedure recommended by Judge
Fee for determining the relevance and materiality of the documents
sought. Thus, it is difficult to argue that Hermann fully extended the
prior cases to private individuals.
But even if the Endicott Johnson, Oklahoma Press, and Morton
Salt decisions are limited to their facts, (i.e. embracing only corporate
witnesses), the Shapiro doctrine would seem to lead to the same result
for individuals requested to produce required records. As has been
pointed out on many occasions, the administrative subpoena seeking
books, records and documents constitutes only a figurative or con-
structive search and seizure, to which Fourth Amendment protections
are only available by analogy. 197 And if, as the leading case of Boyd v.
United Statesi" tells us, the analogy is appropriate because of the
interrelationship of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, then it is only
the compulsory production of material protected by the privilege
against self-incrimination which will constitute an unreasonable search
and seizure. 199
 Therefore it can be argued, consistently with Boyd, that
the Fourth Amendment is not only inapplicable to demands for non-
incriminating documents but, as a result of Shapiro, is now inapplicable
to incriminating documents which are required by law to be kept since,
as to them, the Fifth Amendment affords no protection. Thus, the indi-
vidual holding such records is in no better position as to those records
than a corporation or corporate officer is as to corporate records.'"
This reasoning, however, might still leave it open for a court to hold
that incriminating records which are not required by law to be kept
are held by the individual subject to the Fourth Amendment require-
ment that they not be subpoenaed except upon a showing of probable
cause.
There is another approach to the key decisions which might justify
special treatment for private individuals. A characteristic method of
eliminating constitutional roadblocks to governmental control and
regulation has been to find that the privilege of conducting an activity
is granted subject to qualifications or conditions, by virtue of which
constitutional rights are excluded from the grant or surrendered as the
187 Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, supra note 159, at 202.
198 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
188 But see note 125, supra.
2°9 See Shapiro v. United States, supra note 165, at 55 (Mr. Justice Frankfurter
dissenting) quoted in text at note 166, supra ; Application of House, supra note 171,
at 99 ("If it is not self-incriminating to require taxpayers to turn over these documents,
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price of receiving it 201 As Mr. Justice Jackson stated in Morton Salt,
justifying the broad powers of inquisition held by law-enforcing
agencies over corporations: "They [corporations] have a collective
impact upon society, from which they derive the privilege of acting as
artificial entities. The Federal Government allows them the privilege
of engaging in interstate commerce. Favors from government often
carry with them an enhanced measure of regulation.""'" It would
follow, then, that the major decisions involving investigations of cor-
porations could be restricted in their Fourth Amendment limiting effect
to corporate bodies and to activities franchised by the government or
subject to governmental regulation; and, similarly, that Shapiro, which
involved an activity clearly within the power of Congress to regulate
and license during wartime, would not apply to individuals engaged in
non-regulated activities.
This reasoning is not entirely unsupported. Appropriate language
has already been cited from Morton Salt 203 In Oklahoma Press the
Court relied heavily on the corporate character of the documents
sought and on the broad visitorial and investigative powers of the
government over corporations.'" It cited Wilson v. United States,'
the earlier case in which the Supreme Court had placed corporate docu-
ments outside the protection of the privilege against self-incrimination.
In Wilson the Court plainly based its decision upon the burden of dis-
closure which attaches to the privilege of corporate existence. There,
Mr. Justice Hughes quoted extensively from Hale v. Henkel' where,
quaintly reflecting the limited government of an earlier day, the Court
contrasted the rights of the individual with those of the corporation.
It noted that the individual owes no duty to the State "to divulge his
business, or to open his doors to an investigation ... since he receives
nothing therefrom, beyond the protection of his life and property." The
corporation, however, "receives certain special privileges and fran-
chises, and holds them subject to the laws of the State and the limita-
tions of its charter • . . . There is a reserved right in the legislature to
investigate its contracts and find out whether it has exceeded its
powers."207
Notwithstanding the transition from the laissez-faire government
of 1911 to the modern welfare state, this reasoning is still viable,
insofar as it supports a principle which leaves constitutional rights un-
it is difficult to see why it is an unreasonable search and seizure, provided the statutory
procedure is observed.")
201 See Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1595 (1960).
202 Supra note 187, at 652.
203 Ibid.
204 Supra note 159, at 204.
205 Supra note 188.
208 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
207 Id. at 74-75.
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trammelled except where surrendered in aid of the regulation of the
exercise of a special privilege which Congress could withhold.
Likewise, on its facts, if not on its reasoning, Shapiro v. United
States provides support for the suggested benefit-burden theory. The
decision is grounded mainly on the notion that records required to
be kept become quasi-public records; this is obviously a boot-strap
argument which can lead only to the absurd results suggested by Mr.
Justice Frankfurter in his dissent.` {1& However, the majority clearly
recognized that Congress, by virtue of its extraordinary war emergency
powers, could constitutionally license the very ordinary business ac-
tivities which were involved. It noted that the transaction which was
recorded in the particular record which had caused the difficulty "was
one in which the petitioner could lawfully engage solely by virtue of
the license granted to him under the statute!' And when it admitted .
the existence of constitutional boundaries on the power of government
to require records to be kept, the majority avoided the application of
those mysterious limitations to the case before them by stating:
[N]o serious misgiving that those bounds have been over-
stepped would appear to be evoked when there is a sufficient
relation between the activity sought to be regulated and the
public concern so that the Government can constitutionally
regulate or forbid the basic activity concerned, and can con-
stitutionally require the keeping of particular records, subject
to inspection by the Administrator. (Emphasis supplied. )210
By emphasizing the power to forbid the activity, it is possible to bring
this decision within the benefit-burden theory. Since Congress had
power to prevent Shapiro from wholesaling fruit and produce, it could
grant him the privilege of doing so on the condition that he relinquish
his privilege against self-incrimination as to those books and records
which must be kept if the authorized controls were to be enforced.
The benefit-burden approach, however, presents some logical dif-
ficulties. In the first place, where the surrender of rights is grounded
on the consent of the recipient of the privilege or on the deliberate
reservation of rights by the government, it must be conceded that such
consent or reservation is ordinarily implied, and is, therefore, fic-
tional.'" In the ordinary case, the regulated individual is probably
totally unaware that he has relinquished any rights; and the state does
not expressly reserve its rights of visitation each time it issues a cor-
porate charter. Furthermore, it is unrealistic in the extreme to assert
2" Supra note 165, at 55.
2•  Id. at 35.
210 Id. at 32.
211 See Meltzer, supra note 168, at 701-19; 78 Harv. L. Rev. 455, supra note 189, at
456-57. Cf. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318-19 (1945).
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that an individual subject to regulation had a choice which he volun-
tarily undertook, especially in the Shapiro type of situation, where
thousands of businessmen suddenly found that their ordinary means
of earning a livelihood had become a licensed activity.
Secondly, the Supreme Court itself has seemed to reject this ap-
proach. In United States v. White, 212 the Wilson doctrine, denying
corporate officers the privilege against self-incrimination as to cor-
porate documents in their possession, was extended to custodians
of the records of impersonal unincorporated associations. The opinion
made it clear that the Court was not relying on any reservation of
rights or on the granting of any benefit. It stated:
The fact that the state charters corporations and has
visitorial powers over them provides a convenient vehicle for
justification of governmental investigation of corporate books
and records. Hale v. Henkel, supra; Wilson v. United States,
supra. But the absence of that fact as to a particular type of
organization does not lessen the public necessity for making
reasonable regulation of its activities effective, nor does it
confer upon such an organization the purely personal privilege
against self-incrimination. Basically, the power to compel the
production of the records of any organization, whether it be
incorporated or not, arises out of the inherent and necessary
power of the federal and state governments to enforce their
laws, with the privilege against self-incrimination being lim-
ited to its historic function of protecting only the natural
individual from compulsory incrimination through his own
testimony or personal records.'
It must be noted, however, that on its facts the White case may be
consistent with the suggested approach. The organization being inves-
tigated, a union, was subject to government regulation with respect
to the activity being investigated—the construction of a naval supply
depot. The granted benefit was the government contract and the result-
ant jobs for union members. Nonetheless, it must be conceded that
the articulated policy underlying the limitation of constitutional rights
in agency investigations evidenced by this case and in the key decisions
cannot be restricted to cases where Congress is exercising regulatory
power. This policy provides that governmental agencies conducting
activities properly authorized by Congress must have investigatory
powers equal to their tasks. Thus, Mr. Justice Jackson, in his dissent
in Shapiro, apparently saw no logic in limiting the required records
doctrine to regulatory laws 214
212
 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
213 Id. at 700-01.
214 Supra note 165, at 70-71.
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Lastly, Hannah v. Larche215 provides no support for the benefit-
burden approach either in its reasoning or on its facts. Private individ-
uals, exercising no regulated privilege at the grace of the government,
were held not entitled to the due process rights of apprisal, confronta-
tion and cross-examination when summoned to testify before the Civil
Rights Commission.
In spite of these difficulties, however, there may be merit in re-
stricting the scope of the key decisions, save Hannah, to persons sum-
moned to testify or to produce documents relating to activities which
they carry on at the grace of the government:2" Otherwise, we may be
left with a situation in which Congress has uncontrolled discretion to
undermine Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights in any area in which
it is constitutionally empowered to act, simply by granting investigative
powers and imposing record-keeping requirements in aid of such power.
This, as Professor Meltzer has mildly stated, "is a bizarre result in
a constitutional system.' Once we concede that the implementation
of authorized powers justifies a relaxation of some constitutional pro-
tections under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, there is nothing in
logic to prevent relaxation of other, more fundamental rights as well
in aid of the exercise of other powers. 218
 Secondly, watching the na-
tion's highest court strike down constitutional rights designed to
afford protection against governmental powers on the theory that those
powers will be difficult to exercise if the rights are left standing is
not a pretty sight. Accordingly, if the choice is between leaving the
limitations on Congress' power to destroy these rights to the vagaries
of a general policy favoring such power, or on the other hand, fashion-
ing an a posteriori rule which may be based to some extent upon a
fiction, but which affords a reasonable basis for justifying the with-
drawal of rights in most of the past cases and for drawing a penumbral
boundary limiting the withdrawal of such rights in future cases, the
desire for logic and consistency should not interfere with our prefer-
ence for the fiction.'" Of course, one could take the absolutist view,
suggested by Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Shapiro, that the
exercise of congressional power never justifies the relaxation of the
215 Supra. note 175.
219 Cf. Cooley v. Bergin, 27 F.2d 930, 933 (D. Mass. 1928):
A national bank is a public institution, receiving a valuable franchise from
the government, and it should recognize an obligation to aid the federal
authorities in the administration of its laws, so far as it is compatible with its
duty to its customers.
217 Supra note 168, at 712.
218 See Mr. Justice Jackson's dissenting opinion in Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S.
1, 70-71 (1948).
219 There are better alternatives. Some of them are explored in the remainder of this
article.
703
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
constitutional rights of individuals. In attacking the majority's view
that records become "public" if they are the records of a business
subject to government regulation or licensing, he stated:
While Congress may in time of war, or perhaps in circum-
stances of economic crisis, provide for the licensing of every
individual business, surely such licensing requirements do not
remove the records of a man's private business from the pro-
tection afforded by the Fifth Amendment. Even the exercise
of the war power is subject to the Fifth Amendment. 22°
The adoption of this view, which is perhaps more forthright than the
benefit-burden theory, would require the overruling of Shapiro, a pos-
sibility which ought not to be discounted.
From the Service's point of view, however, the granting of greater
protection to individuals than to impersonal organizations may not be
the best solution. It is mechanistic and gives no weight to the Service's
legitimate needs for information. Such needs may vary greatly from
investigation to investigation because of facts other than the status
of the witness.
13. Providing Special Treatment for Tax Investigations
The prospects for convincing the Court that tax investigations
should receive special treatment appear to be dim, since the Court has
already accepted the analogy between such investigations and investi-
gations conducted by other governmental agencies. In light of the
importance of the policy questions involved, however, it might be
possible to persuade the Court, or, if not the Court, then the Congress,
to re-examine this analogy.
1. Sources of Power
The most obvious distinction between the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice and the agencies involved in the key decisions is that none of the
latter involved a delegation by Congress of its constitutional power
to lay and collect taxes. In Shapiro, for example, the Price Adminis-
trator of the Emergency Price Control Act was acting under a delega-
tion by Congress of its emergency war powers."' From this it might
be argued that Congress had greater investigatory power to delegate
in Shapiro under its war powers than it has under its taxing power.
Similar reasoning might be advanced to distinguish the diverse powers
exercised by the agencies involved in the other cases. On closer
scrutiny, however, this argument breaks down. The power to pass laws
220 Supra note 218, at 65.
221 See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944), especially the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Roberts at 459.
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providing for investigations, whether it derives from the war power,
the power to regulate commerce, the power to legislate, the power to
levy and collect taxes, or, for that matter, from any other enumerated
power, is nowhere expressly provided for in the Constitution. It is an
implied or incidental power which exists by the grace of the "necessary
and proper" clause:222 To try to divine limitations on particular types
of investigations, not applicable to others, from this clause in the Con-
stitution is an exercise in futility:223
2. Functional Differences
In Hannah v. Larche the Court was careful to note that the Civil
Rights Commission was performing a purely investigative rather than
an adjudicative function.224 The implication was clear that the decision
would have gone the other way had the Commission been engaged in
adjudication. This suggests that there may be some merit in comparing
the functions performed by the IRS with those performed by other
agencies in order to find possible bases for distinguishing their respec-
tive investigative powers:4"
At the outset, it must be recognized that investigations often serve
a variety of purposes—some immediate, others consequential or re-
mote. Most investigations conducted by governmental agencies have as
their primary objective the finding of facts. These facts may then be
used in any number of ways by the investigating agency itself or by
other agencies to aid the performance of other functions or objectives.
Thus, the purpose of an investigation may be described in terms of its
ultimate utility, as in aid of a particular type of power reposed in Con-
gress—e.g., regulation, revenue collection, legislation, etc. Or it may
be useful, for purposes of comparison, to label an investigation by
reference to the functional phases of the decision-making process in
which the agencies using the facts are involved. These functional
phases may include intelligence gathering, recommending, invoking,
applying, prescribing, appraising, and terminating.'"
222 U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8.
293 Cf. Meltzer, Required Records, the McCarran Act, and the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination, 18 U. Chi. L. Rev. 687, 717 (1951).
224 363 U.S. 420, 451 (1960).
225 Consult Newman, Due Process, Investigations, and Civil Rights, 8 U.C.L.A. L.
Rev. 735, 752-54 (1961) and Note, The Distinction Between Informing and Prosecutorial
Investigations: A Functional Justification for "Star Chamber" Proceedings, 72 Yale L.J.
1227 (1963).
226 Consult McDougal & Associates, Studies in Minimum World Order 14-15 (1960) :
(1) Prescription is the articulation of general requirements of conduct . „ .
Prior in time to prescription in a given sequence is (2) recommendation, or the
promoting of prescriptions • „ . Also the (3) intelligence function is typically
prior in time to prescription or recommendation; it includes the gathering and
processing of information about past events and the making of estimates of the
future, especially of the costs and gains of alternative policies 	 .
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If the ultimate objective of federal tax investigations is con-
sidered, it becomes obvious that, on this basis, no demand for greater
protection for witnesses involved in such investigation can be justified.
In fact, the converse is true. Since adequate revenue is necessary for
the operation of nearly all governmental functions, it can hardly be
argued that its collection is less important, and therefore less deserving
of effective instruments of enforcement, than the functions performed
by the other agencies."'
When the functional phases of the decision-making process en-
gaged in by the agencies involved in the leading decisions are compared
with those engaged in by the IRS, with the exception of Hannah v.
Larche, the same result obtains. Translating the authorized purposes
of federal tax investigations into functional categories, the Service may
be said to investigate for the purpose of invoking the prescriptions
which it is its job to administer—the Internal Revenue Code. That is,
the information gleaned from an investigation may be the basis on
which the Service initiates action which will ultimately cause the Code
to be applied in particular cases.' The formal application of the Code
is not a function of the Service; rather, this is the job of the Tax
Court or the federal district court; the Service may not adjudicate.'
Nonetheless, the Service effects the application of the Code in particu-
lar cases, frequently obtaining settlement of claims without further
official action. Although rights of taxpayers may actually be affected
by the Service in such a settlement, it is only through the taxpayer's
acquiescence that the Service's determination of his rights becomes
binding, since the taxpayer may insist on a formal hearing de novo.'
Similarly, the agencies and administrators involved in Endicott
Johnson, Oklahoma Press, Morton Salt, Hermann, and Shapiro were
engaged in authorized invocation of the prescriptions and policies which
Congress put in their charge. Since, as in the case of the IRS, the in-
voking of prescriptions in these cases could eventually lead to the
(4) Invocation consists in making a preliminary appeal to a prescription
in the hope of influencing results • . . (5) Application is the final characteriza-
tion of a situation in reference to relevant prescriptions . . . The (6) appraisal
function formulates the relationship between official aims and subsequent levels
of performance . . . . The function of (7) termination is the putting to an end
of authoritative prescriptions and of arrangements arising within them.
227 See Meltzer, supra note 223, at 717.
228 See 9 Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation § 49.01 (1958). See Reich,
Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 673, 731 (1963):
Various types of "civil" or "preliminary" investigations can be used, and
commonly are used, to obtain evidence to be introduced later in criminal
prosecutions. Investigations thus become an integral part of the criminal trial
itself.
229 See Mertens, supra note 228.
230
 However, there is a presumption that the Commissioner's assessment is prime
facie correct. Id. at § 50.71.
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adjudication of the rights of the investigated parties and were in fact
performed for that purpose, a comparison of functions provides no
support for the argument that witnesses before the IRS are entitled
to greater protection than that afforded in the other agencies. An argu-
ment might be made, however, that a party before the IRS is entitled
to less protection than one before an agency performing the applying
function such as, for example, the CAB with its quasi-judicial powers.
There are, however, several factors which militate against this argu-
ment. In the first place, the quasi-judicial functions of administrative
agencies are often separated from the preliminary investigations con-
ducted to invoke those functions. Secondly, the Court in Oklahoma
Press seemed to reject a proffered distinction between the powers of
agencies with quasi-judicial powers and those which could only invoke
action by the courts. The Court noted:
The mere fact that the first stage of formal adjudication is
administrative in the one case and judicial in the other would
seem to make no difference with the power of Congress to
authorize either the preliminary investigation or the use of
the subpoena power in aid of it.'
The force of this declaration seems to be supported by the simple
fact that the substantive rights of the party being investigated are
as much in jeopardy when the agency turns the matter over to the
courts for adjudication as they are when the agency itself conducts
the formal hearing."' Lastly, the Fourth Amendment and the privilege
against self-incrimination have traditionally provided protection even
before any actual adjudication of a witness's rights has begun?' Thus,
their application should not depend on whether the agency conducting
the investigation intends to invoke the aid of a court or to make its
own binding determination.
In Hannah v. Larche, however, the Civil Rights Commission was
engaged in the performance of functions entirely different from those
involved in the other cases and from those performed by the IRS in
ordinary tax investigations. Essentially, the Commission was authori-
zed to perform an intelligence function—the gathering of information
and its transmission to the Congress and the President; an appraisal
function--the examination of the effectiveness of existing prescriptions
and policies in light of the constitutional provision for equal protection
of the laws; and a recommending function--the presentation of pre-
scriptions and policies to the President and the Congress with a view
231 327 U.S. 186, 212 n.51 (1946).
232 See Reich, supra note 228.
233 See In re Andrews' Tax Liability, 18 F. Supp. 804, 807 (D. Md. 1937) ; cf.
Escobedo v. Illinois, supra note 181; Meltzer, supra note 223, at 693. But cf. Sullivan v.
United States, 274 U.S. 259 (1927).
707
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
to their adoption in the future and the presentation of suggestions for
termination or modification of existing prescriptions and policies.'
The Court, in holding the claim of due process inapplicable, relied
heavily on the purely investigative, non-adjudicative nature of the
Commission's function. Rightly or wrongly it refused to take into
account the possibility that results not specifically authorized, such as
the application of existing prescriptions to the witness by other agencies
using information gathered by the Commission, might ultimately occur,
since "such collateral consequences . . . would not be the result of any
affirmative determinations by the Commission."' It therefore termed
the Commission's function purely investigative. In light of the funda-
mental differences in the authorized functions being performed by the
Commission as compared to those of the IRS, especially the fact that
the former is more remote from the applying function than the latter,
it can be argued that Hannah does not apply to tax investigations.'"
Thus the Supreme Court is not bound by its decision in that case
should the question of the existence of the right of apprisal of a witness
in a federal tax investigation come before it.
3. Grand Jury Inquisitions Distinguished
Another organ of government with which the Internal Revenue
Service should be compared is the grand jury, since it possesses ex-
tremely broad investigative powers. These include the power to conduct
investigations without the necessity of establishing probable cause
to believe that any particular law has been violated" and, in some
cases, to engage in inquisitions of anti-social conduct against which no
countervailing sanctions exist.' In its proceedings, which are protected
by secrecy,' witnesses are not afforded the rights of apprisal, con-
frontation, and cross-examination.""
There is already an impressive body of authority which has
equated the investigatory powers of grand juries with those held by
administrative agencies in general" and the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice in particular."' Ordinarily, the analogy follows from a reasoned
234 Hannah v. Larche, supra note 224, at 440-41.
235 Id. at 443.
238 But cf. Torres v. Stradley, 103 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Ga. 1952).
237 Hale v. Henkel, supra note 206, at 58-66.
238 See Dession & Cohen, The Inquisitional Functions of Grand Juries, 41 Yale L.J.
687 (1932).
232 See In re April 1956 Term Grand Jury, 239 F.2d 263 (7th Cir. 1956) and cases
there cited; Note, The Grand Jury as an Investigatory Body, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 590, 600
(1961).
240 See Hannah v. Larche, supra note 224, at 448-49; 74 Harv. L. Rev. 590, supra
note 239, at 599-601.
241 Including, of course, Oklahoma Press and Morton Salt. See note 191, supra.
242 United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964); Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d
734, 737, 742 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953) (The court noted the "im-
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decision that the administrative agency seeking such powers is inde-
pendently entitled to them on constitutional and statutory grounds,
and merely serves the purpose of illustrating the type or extent of
investigatory power available to such agency."' There can be no quar-
rel with this type of decision. There is danger, however, that judges
may uncritically equate administrative agencies with grand juries and
then grant such agencies equally broad powers without first finding
independent justification for the grant.'
It must be remembered that the grand jury found its way into
the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution—a part of the Bill of Rights
—as a buffer between the individual and the awesome power of the
State.' Their members, drawn from the "neighborhood," may be
far more impartial than legislators or employees of administrative
agencies."' It is this protective feature of the invoking and recom-
mending functions of the grand jury which gives that body its unique
characteristics. It would be a perversion of reason, therefore, to take
the same broad powers of inquisition and accusation vested in a tribu-
nal designed to protect the citizen from oppressive activities of agen-
cies of government, to deliver them up to those agencies, and then to
justify the handout on the ground that the grand jury and the recipient
agencies are performing similar functions."'
C. Hoover Commission Recommendations
The Hoover Commission Task Force has suggested that Section
6 of the Administrative Procedure Act be amended "to establish a
jurisdictional prerequisite for the issuance of a subpena [sic] and for
the initiation, as well as the conduct, of any investigation.'>248
 While
this amendment would, in effect, overrule the earlier decisions by re-
portant difference" that reports of grand juries are made to the courts, while the results
of tax investigations are reported to the Commissioner, who then decides on appropriate
action. Id. at 737.) But see Hubner v. Tucker, 245 F.2d 35, 39 n.6 (9th Cir. 1957) ("The
agency is not the arm of a court, as is a grand jury.")
243 E.g., Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, supra note 231.
244 E.g., BrOWCISOI1 v. United States, 32 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1929).
245 See Ex Parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1 (1887); 74 Harv. L, Rev. 590, supra note 239.
245 See dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in Hannah v. Larche, supra note
224, at 498.
247 It is true, of course, that investigations conducted by administrative agencies
have largely displaced the grand jury in the enforcement of federal legislation. Murchison,
Rights of Persons Compelled to Appear in Federal Agency Investigational Hearings, 62
Mich. L. Rev. 485, 503 (1964). It would seem to follow, therefore, that since administra-
tive investigations have become a part of the process for applying criminal sanctions, the
protections which are available in a criminal trial ought to be extended to witnesses in
these investigations. See Reich, supra note 228. Also see U.S. Comm'n on Organization of
the Executive Branch of the Government, Report on Legal Services and Procedure 175
(1955) ; Newman, supra note 225, at 754-55; 72 Yale L.J. 1227, supra note 225, at 1231.
249 U.S. Comm'n on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, supra
note 247.
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quiring the administrator to establish coverage as a condition of court
enforcement of the summons, its impact on tax investigations would be
questionable, since, as has been pointed out, there is practically no per-
son or firm over whom the IRS does not already have jurisdiction.
Another recommended amendment, which would require agencies
to investigate only when "authorized by statute," and not just when
"authorized by law,"249
 would also prove ineffectual to impose the
suggested limitations on tax investigations, since such investigations are
already governed by statute.
Rather, as suggested below, the existing sections of the Internal
Revenue Code might be amended to add the needed protection.
D. Procedural Changes
In federal tax investigations the collective interest in private
security is in jeopardy only insofar as the IRS can freely use its inves-
tigatory powers for the purpose of general fact-finding, and not when
they are legitimately used only for the revenue purposes enumerated in
the statute.' It follows, therefore, that the private interest would be
protected if sufficient conditions were imposed to discourage free-
wheeling use of investigations for purposes other than those enumerated
in the statute. And the public interest in the collection of revenue
would be protected if these conditions were not so burdensome as to
interfere with the efficient operation of the revenue system. 251
What conditions can fulfill both requirements? It is suggested
that the desired accomodation can be achieved if the judge called
upon to enforce a revenue summons will require the Service to estab-
lish to his satisfaction either one of two conditions: (1) that a reason-
able basis for suspecting an assessable violation of the Internal Reve-
nue Code exists or (2) that the requested inspection or examination is
essential to the preservation of the integrity of the self-assessment sys-
tem of tax collection.
As to condition (1), the judge should require a presentation of
facts sufficient to satisfy him that there exists a reasonable suspicion
that there has been a civil violation of the tax laws.252
 He should not
249 Ibid.
250 See Pt. II, supra.
261 Cf. the opinion of L. Hand, J. in McMann v. SEC, 87 F.2d 377, 378 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 301 U.S. 684 (1937): "The suppression of truth is a grievous necessity at best,
more especially when as here the inquiry concerns the public interest; it can be justified
at all only when the opposed private interest is supreme."
252 Prior to Powell there was no general agreement as to what constituted probable
cause among those circuits which required such a showing before enforcing a revenue
summons. See United States v. Powell, supra note 242, at 59 n.2 (dissenting opinion).
It is not my intention here to express a preference for any one of the three tests men-
tioned in the Powell case. In the interests of uniformity, however, the standard for
probable cause set forth in United States v. Ventresca, 85 Sup. Ct. 741 (1965) might
be applied.
710
INVESTIGATIVE POWERS OF THE IRS
accept a conclusionary allegation of suspicion on the part of the agent
seeking enforcement, since to do so would defeat the very purpose of
the condition. As to condition (2), it should be open to the Service to
show that the particular examination or type of examination sought is
an essential phase of enforcement of the revenue laws or, at the very
least, extremely useful in deterring tax avoidance. Most tax investiga-
tions would tend to fall within the second category. To ease the burden
on the Service, general ground rules might be formulated. For example,
the court may presuMe that the right to make one thorough-going ex-
amination of each taxpayer for each tax year still open to assessment
within the three year statute of limitations is essential to the integrity
of the self-assessment system. In requesting judicial aid in securing
such an examination, the Service need only establish that the examina-
tion is of an open year, and that the records sought pertain to the tax
liability for that year.
Similar presumptions could be created for other investigations,
even of closed years, if the Service could show that the particular ex-
amination requested fulfilled any one of the following requirements:
(1) That it was part of a non-discriminatory program to re-ex-
amine certain groups of taxpayers, even if the groups were
selected without any particular suspicion of actual viola-
tions. This could be shown, for example, by proof that ex-
aminations of others in the same class were being conducted
or that the names were selected at random (e.g., every fifth
name on a list) or by a computer. If a specific class were
selected, however, the selection ought to be tied in with
some consideration relevant to taxation, such as business or
profession, and not be based on irrelevancies, such as poli-
tical affiliation or religion.
(2) That the taxpayer under investigation was a large firm with
highly complex financial transactions.
(3) That the taxpayer under investigation has a history of tax
evasion or tax fraud, or even that he has frequently made
errors in his returns.
Again, however, the judge or commissioner should not have to
accept the Service's subjective averment regarding the essentiality of
the investigation, but should remain free to make his own determina-
tion that this condition has been fulfilled, always keeping in mind the
potential danger to individual security if the Service is not kept within
its legitimate functions.'"
As an additional precaution, easily complied with, the Service
233 Unless the Supreme Court is willing to reconsider the decision in Powell, these
recommendations would have to be implemented by Congress.
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might be required to send a "Commissioner's letter" with every sum-
mons issued under the authority of Section 7602 of the Code. Each
letter would contain a sworn affidavit signed by a responsible super-
visory official of the IRS, above the level of a revenue agent, attest-
ing that the requested examination was being conducted pursuant to
purposes authorized by section 7602 and for no other purposes. In
addition, the affidavit would set forth those purposes in detail. This
requirement would tend to insulate the summoned party from the
uncontrolled discretion of "low-echelon revenue agents,"254 would give
the courts a basis for determining whether the stated purposes of the
examination are authorized under section 7602 in order to determine
whether issuance of an order would constitute an abuse of process,
and, most importantly, would make the official signing the affidavit
think twice about proceeding with an examination for improper
purposes.
Assuming that the foregoing conditions are imposed, along with
the suggested presumptions or "ground rules," the Service will still
have a large residual area within which its summonses will be freely
enforced. In this area, therefore, the potential expansion of power
could still occur in spite of the imposition of the suggested conditions.
This potential can be curbed by imposing additional conditions to the
application of the Shapiro doctrine or by making the doctrine inap-
plicable to tax investigations, and by limiting the application of
Hermann and Hannah. Thus, the Revenue Service would become less
attractive as a general fact gathering agency.
In Shapiro the Court took notice of testimony before a Senate
Committee which indicated that Congress imposed record-keeping re-
quirements because, without them, the Emergency Price Control Act
could not have been effectively enforced.'" It would not be stretching
things too far, therefore, to require that the doctrine which effects
the withdrawal of the privilege against self-incrimination from required
records only apply in cases where its use is essential to the en-
forcement of the act which contains the record-keeping require-
ments. Thus, in tax investigations the Service should be required to
establish that other available sources of information or methods of
investigation would not provide sufficient information upon which to
base a determination of tax liability. Otherwise, the taxpayer, or a
third party summoned in an investigation of a taxpayer, should not be
barred from pleading the privilege against self-incrimination as to
254 The Court in Powell held that the "necessity" requirement was intended to curb
the investigating powers of "low-echelon revenue agents" by requiring them to clear
"any repetitive examination with a superior." 379 U.S. 48, 55-56. Thus this recommenda-
tion is not entirely inconsistent with Powell, although it, too, would require legislative
implementation.
255 335 U.S. 1, 11 (1948).
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his own records. 25° This requirement would not only make the Service
less attractive as a fact-gathering agency for other governmental in-
strumentalities, but would also further the individual-protective policy
of the privilege itself. Furthermore, the Service, which has been some-
what reluctant to assert the Shapiro doctrine in the past, could feel free
to make use of it in cases where its use would prove most helpful, i.e.,
where the Service would otherwise be powerless to ascertain a tax
deficiency. Alternatively, the required records doctrine could be with-
drawn as an investigatorial instrument in all or most tax investigations
either by limiting its application to war emergency measures similar
to the act from which it sprang or by restricting its availability to in-
vestigations of witnesses operating under a license or franchise from
the government. There is ample support for either restriction, not the
least of which is Shapiro itself and the insistent demands of the
dissents.2"
In situations where the required records doctrine is made avail-
able, or where the witness does not claim the privilege against self-
incrimination as to the subpoenaed material, the Service's privilege to
engage in untrammeled examination of books, records and papers
which may later turn out to be irrelevant or immaterial provides addi-
tional opportunity for the Service to engage in examinations for non-
revenue purposes. If the documents sought are clearly relevant to an
authorized purpose on the face of the subpoena—as in the case of the
taxpayer's books of account for the years under examination—then
the court should be free to order immediate compliance. When, how-
ever, the description of the materials sought in the subpoena does not
clearly indicate the relevance of each particular document sought—
either to the years under investigation if entire tax years are being
investigated or to the particular transaction if the examination is so
limited—then the enforcing judge should pass upon the relevance and
materiality of each document to which the summoned party raises an
objection. The duty of a court to prevent an abuse of its own pro-
cesses, reaffirmed in Powell, would seem to require as much. To accom-
plish this purpose, the procedure adopted by the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit and later rejected in Hermann might be reinstated
in cases involving tax investigations. 258
 To avoid imposing an undue
255 Cf. Note, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 455, 459 (1964), where it is suggested that the
privilege should only apply to documents in the possession of the witness when there is
no other person in the same jurisdiction who "has the right to possess or inspect them
independently of the government's interest in criminal prosecution, but who would not
be incriminated by their contents."
257 Cf. Application of Daniels, 140 F. Supp. 322 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). Should the
Shapiro doctrine be overruled or limited, then it might be wise to consider a federal
witness immunity act. See Note, The Federal Witness Immunity Acts in Theory and
Practice: Treading the Constitutional Tightrope, 72 Yale L.J. 1568 (1963).
25g This result can be achieved by the courts if CAB v. Hermann is held narrowly
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burden on the trial judge in cases involving a demand for a substantial
number of documents, the court might refer the documents to a master
for his determination."
The proposal for a new type of commissioner's letter, suggested
above, which would require a supervisory official to set forth the
purposes of the examination in an affidavit sent along with a summons,
would seem to satisfy the right of apprisal in all cases where the
investigation has proceeded to the formal stage of issuing a summons.
However, there is still danger to a taxpayer confronted by a revenue
agent in what he believes to be a routine audit. By limiting the thrust
of Hannah, based on the aforementioned functional distinctions be-
tween the Civil Rights Commission and the IRS, the courts might
require revenue agents to apprise persons being audited of the pos-
sible existence of any objectives other than those enumerated in sec-
tion 7602, if any in fact exist.' The taxpayer would then be in a
better position to utilize his refurbished constitutional and statutory
protection. To the extent that every examination for civil violations
involves the possibility of uncovering criminal violations, this practice
may well tend to frighten otherwise cooperative witnesses into silence.
This problem might be mitigated by presenting each taxpayer being
subjected to a purely routine audit with a form letter from the Com-
missioner indicating that such possibility exists in every audit of that
nature"
E. An Ombudsman for the Internal Revenue Service
One proposal which has been aired frequently of late in connec-
tion with the functions of administrative agencies in general may have
merit in its application to the functions of the Internal Revenue
Service. The appointment of an Ombudsman, a prestigious citizen who
oversees the activities of administrative agencies and civil servants,
who entertains and investigates complaints from the public, who ini-
tiates his own investigations of administrative agency operations, and
who may also criticize and publicize, might well be a long range solu-
tion to the problem of unwanted expansion of agency powers, as well
to its facts. See Note, Resisting Enforcement of Administrative Subpoenas Duces Tecum:
Another Look at CAB v. Hermann, 69 Yale L.J. 131, 137 (1959).
200 Fed. R. Civ. P..53. See 5 Moore, Federal Practice, ch. 53 (1964),
200 That apprisal may not be "disruptive of orderly investigation" is suggested in
Newman, Due Process, Investigations and Civil Rights, supra note 225, at 744. See also
Ludlam, Tax Fraud Investigations: A Plea for Constitutional Procedures, 43 A.B.A.J.
1009 (1957).
2111 To make these recommendations effective, it would seem to follow that evidence
collected in violation of the witness' rights ought to be suppressed. See Fed. R. Crim. P.
41(e) ; 8 Wigmore, Evidence, ch. 75 (McNaughton rev. 1961, Supp. 1964) ; Burns,
Searches and Seizures: The Suppression of Evidence, 20 Inst. Fed. Tax. (N.Y.U.) 1081
(1962).
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as to other vital problems relating to agency functions."' In view of
the size and complexity of the Internal Revenue Service an institu-
tion in the nature of an Ombudsman, specialized in overseeing the
operations of that agency, and composed of one or more prominent
officials with an adequate staff, might be required. The creation of
such an institution would perhaps make the need for some of the
specific procedural proposals recommended here less pressing.
VI. CONCLUSION
If the potential danger to the right to be let alone had been care-
fully considered and clearly perceived by the Supreme Court when it
passed upon the investigatory powers of the Internal Revenue Service,
a compelling ground for granting witnesses greater constitutional
and statutory protection in revenue investigations than that afforded
to witnesses in investigations conducted by less ubiquitous agen-
cies might have been found. Instead, the Court, in United States v.
Powell,"' chose not to differentiate between various agencies. It pointed
out that the district courts may refuse to enforce summonses issued
for improper purposes or in violation of the technical requirements
of applicable statutes, apparently assuming that the power of a court
to prevent an abuse of its own processes would prove sufficient to
protect aggrieved parties from administrative overreaching.
Unfortunately, prior interpretations of constitutional protections
taken together with the Court's narrow reading of statutory require-
ments and its holding that the burden of proving abuse lies with the
aggrieved party, render the hoped for protection illusory. Now that
Powell has been decided, the danger of undesired expansion of inquisi-
tional power is greater than ever.
It may be argued, however, that it would be advantageous, from
the point of view of governmental economy and efficiency, if one
agency, such as the Internal Revenue Service, could act fully to in-
vestigate for the purpose of providing and maintaining a repository of
information about all citizens for the benefit of all other governmental
agencies, whether or not they possess their own investigatory powers.
When the size of the nation, the complexities of its institutions, and
the problems it faces are realistically recognized, it is not difficult to
join with the advocates of such an agency. Yet one must not be blind
to the dangers an agency of this sort would cause to the right to be
let alone and to the concomitant protection against the tyranny
262 See Christensen, The Danish Ombudsman, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1100 (1961) ; Davis,
Ombudsmen in America: Officers to Criticize Administrative Action, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1057 (1961) ; Farley & Farley, An American Ombudsman: Due Process in the Administra-
tive State, 16 Ad. L. Rev. 212 (1964) ; Jagerskiold. The Swedish Ombudsman, 109 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 1077 (1961).
263 Supra note 242.
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of petty officialdom which that right affords, for these constitute part
of the fabric of a society where governmental interference with in-
dividual privacy has been the exception rather than the rule. If such an
agency is to be created, therefore, it should be the product of open
debate and resolution on the floor of Congress where all of its dangers
and advantages can be aired, and where the need for such an agency
can be balanced against the impact it will have on the society."' It
should not be allowed to come into existence by default—by virtue
of a gradual judicial release of power into the hands of one agency
which, because of its size and pervasiveness of its activities, can
one day begin to act as the government's official inquisitor. In short,
unlimited power in such an agency should not be permitted in the
absence, to quote Mr. Justice Holmes, of the "most explicit language"
of Congress.
Since the Supreme Court has not seen fit to interpret legislation
authorizing agency intelligence-gathering narrowly even in the absence
of explicit language, it does not seem unreasonable to recommend
alternatives which, in the main, will restrict future Internal Revenue
Service investigations to those conducted for specifically authorized
purposes. Among those suggested here are proposals for judicial deci-
sion-making well within the analytical technique of American courts
and proposals for legislative determinations which are addressed to
the Congress. What these proposals urge is the rejuvenation and, in
some cases, the creation of controls which will remove from the
Service the untrammeled power to determine what investigations it
shall make. In addition, the imposition of some procedural and con-
stitutional requirements which will tend to make the IRS less attrac-
tive as a general inquisitorial agency is suggested. Whatever slight
burden the adoption of these recommendations may impose upon the
Service or the courts would seem to be a small price to pay for the
concomitant protection of the right to privacy which they will afford.
264 Cf. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 539, 29
U.S.C. § 521(a) (Supp. V, 1964) which expressly authorizes the Secretary of Labor to
report facts gleaned from reports required under the act to "interested persons or
officials."
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